Spy chronicles book pdf free download

Talks and Terror Surgical Strike The Deal for Osama bin Laden Selfish Self-interests in Afghanistan Donald Trump, Nudger-in-chief Forge Structure or Break Ice? Council of Spies Akhand Bharat Confederation Doctrine Dulat and I have each mentioned India-Pakistan friendships that were deep and, silly as it may sound, beautiful. It is a growing fear that in the age of shouting heads on TV and hyper-nationalistic NRIs, we are reminiscing about a bygone era. All hope is not lost—my elder daughter was best friends with a Karachi-ite during her undergraduate years at New York University.

On the whole, however, she seems part of a shrinking minority, and a window of opportunity for goodwill between the people of the two nations may be closing. It is to keep that window open, and show that through the window one may see endless possibilities, that this book was written.

The hostilities that are ceasefire violations across the Line of Control erupt occasionally, but the norm is of long periods of peace. Similarly, armed conflict between India and Pakistan has broken out on four occasions in their 71 years of independence. Even the proxy war of terrorism is characterised by intense bursts of violence that occasionally puncture everyday peace. The cold war between nations, conducted by their spy agencies, is continuous, however.

There is no let-up. There are no uniforms, or counter-measures that force terrorists to opt for soft targets. Spies and their networks live 24x7 lies at great risk to themselves. They are a last line of defence. If a Kargil happens, then it is ultimately attributed to intelligence failure. Terrorism is seen as a slippage through an invisible net put up by the agencies.

War is either pursued or averted mainly due to intelligence efforts. The RAW has a similarly sinister image, if not among its own citizens then at least among those across the western border. This book brings together two men who each had a stint at heading their respective agencies. Indians and Pakistanis keep trying to talk to one another. This is open. Spychiefs rarely talk to each other—you can be certain that the spies never do— though there have been occasions when their governments have directed them to do so.

In the last two decades, some former spychiefs have come together to exchange views in Track-II dialogues.

But they have never spoken openly. As the two spymasters say, they are aware of the stakes. What they say to each other, around a table, their guards down, counts for something. Their conversation goes to the heart of the India-Pakistan relationship; a deep dive into the Deep State, if you will. Since he and Durrani had earlier co- authored two papers, his idea was to follow that format. Chiki Sarkar, the publisher at Juggernaut Books, suggested to me that to reach a wider audience as well as to make it an interesting read, it ought to be in a dialogue format.

It was a winning suggestion, in my opinion. There was a meeting that we did on our own in Kathmandu, Nepal March , , though Sudheendra Kulkarni of the Observer Research Foundation, an ardent supporter of the project throughout, offered to facilitate. These meetings produced a total of over 1.

The manuscript prepared for publication was half that size. The transcripts had a lot of spontaneity and the two former chiefs got into the spirit of each discussion; I have tried to retain that tone in the manuscript, despite the second thoughts of each participant at different points. I have also attempted to provide the flowing literary style that Dr Farooq Abdullah told me he admired most about Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years. Sudarshan, who reminded me that this project was an enviable journalistic exercise, and P.

Krishnakumar, who gave me a gig at Mid-Day which was invaluable in more ways than one; and of course my spouse, Bonita Baruah, whom I regard as my better 51 per cent. Who knows, if a madman was in control we could all still be blown to kingdom come, in revenge for or even General Saheb has been a friend.

His straightforwardness is striking. There is no bullshit; for him a spade is always a spade, which is at times disappointing for me. He has never hesitated to speak up or render help. They said he was keen to come.

Since it was early days, people in high places were prepared to listen, so I passed the message along. There was excitement in government, but the bigwigs wanted an assurance that Mian Saheb would come if invited. To confirm, I first called a senior diplomat in Pakistan. His advice was to not risk it, because Nawaz Sharif might not be allowed to come to India.

Somewhat disappointed I called the General. His response was unequivocal; there was no reason for Nawaz Sharif not to come. Generals in Pakistan are generally right, and more so Asad Durrani. My wife Paran and the Begum are poles apart. Paran enjoys an occasional smoke with the General whereas the Begum approves of neither smoking nor drinking. Yet they got along like a house on fire. Incidentally, at the same meeting, the Pakistanis enquired whether there was any hope of forward movement between India and Pakistan.

I stuck my neck out and said something should happen soon. Lo and behold, we were in Abu Dhabi on Christmas Day on our way home when we learnt that Modiji had dropped in at Lahore. Since then, however, the process has gone nowhere. In any India-Pakistan conversation, Kashmir will inevitably come up. In January , during my annual pilgrimage to Goa, I met a Kashmiri in a tailoring shop. He told me that Kashmir wanted independence. Anyone can be stopped and beaten, he claimed.

The slightest protest or stone-pelting leads to tear gas and pellet guns. A reformed militant who had flirted with the Lashkar-e-Toiba visited me more recently and spoke of the threat of increasing radicalism in the Valley. He said the youth in South Kashmir prepared for martyrdom and had no concern for Pakistan as they believed they were fighting for Allah.

Pakistan had been out of it since then, until we brought them back into the picture in The militant, who now resembles a professor more than a terrorist, warned that the Jamaat-e-Islami, once with pockets only in Sopore, Shopian, Kulgam and Pulwama, was now omnipresent in radicalising the youth. The central jail in Srinagar was the hub of radical indoctrination, he said from personal experience.

Militancy was a thriving industry, where everyone was someone with a vested interest in the status quo—except that the status quo is never static. The Kashmiris who crave peace live in fear of the next explosion, not knowing where or when it will happen.

The situation in Kashmir, like our relationship with Pakistan, is going nowhere. It waits for another Vajpayee. Kashmiris crave peace but there can be no peace or forward movement in Kashmir so long as we keep relating it to elections elsewhere in the country, just as we do in our relationship with Pakistan. We need to talk to Pakistan as much as we need to engage with Kashmir. Finding a way out of any mess requires a willingness to listen.

It connects us to Kashmir and to ourselves as well. But we are so caught up in the noise around us that very few have the time to listen. Sentiments at times are more illuminating than facts. Empathy is the key to understanding Kashmir.

Noted Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid once said that if Kashmir were resolved, Afghanistan would be a cakewalk. At one of our meetings, Rustom Shah Mohmand, a Pakistani bureaucrat, diplomat, and a gem of a human being, remarked that Pakistan needed to put its own house in order in Balochistan before finding fault with India in Kashmir. Yes, there was a tinge of sadness at leaving the RAW just when I was beginning to enjoy it; 17 months is not enough for a chief.

But there are so many worlds, so much to do. Retirement is the beginning not the end of life. Who could have imagined I could even become an author in the bargain? As someone said, there is no pleasure in having nothing to do; the fun is in having lots to do and doing nothing. Having lived more than my life of secrecy, spookiness still clings to me. And my wife tells all her friends that you can never get the whole truth out of this spook.

When the idea of a joint project was first mooted by Peter Jones at one of our Track-II meetings in Istanbul, the General laughed and said nobody would believe us even if we wrote fiction. We have tried to stay as close to the truth as we believe it to be even if some of it is regarded as fiction. The reality is that there are normally more than two sides to most stories. Truth is a kaleidoscope. I know there will be people in the fraternity who will say how did these swines get so chummy: who was working for whom?

After all we have each been a part of licensed skulduggery on either side. Not everyone will agree with what we have said, possibly nobody. I have often been labelled an optimist. As Mark Twain puts it, good friends, good books and a sleepy conscience: this is the ideal life.

And this, I believe, is how the General and I have gone about it, even though he is much more of a realist. Finally, this project could never have taken off without our friend, philosopher and guide, Aditya Sinha. Rawalpindi, my birthplace and now the headquarters of the Pakistan Army in which I served for over three decades, is where I live after retirement.

When British India was divided, I was a schoolgoing kid in Sheikhupura, a city that fell on the Pakistani side. I was spared the horrors of the Great Divide, except for a brief glimpse when we visited our relatives in Delhi during summer vacation in The riots forced us to return post-haste, but strangely I have no memories of the journey back home. It must have been one of the lucky trains that got away. One change I recall from soon after Partition was the absence of a matka. The shop halfway to school where we often stopped to sip water had a new owner.

Unlike his Hindu predecessor, he had no use for the pitcher that contained the elixir of life. The next episode to remind me that the worst was not yet over was when we moved from Matka to Mucca. Throughout those years, though the Kashmir issue was simmering somewhere in the background, the study of history in our schools was mostly about the glory of the Muslim rule in India.

Little surprise that it led to some fascination with the seat of power, both political and spiritual: broadly the region bounded by Delhi, Agra and Ajmer. Any link with our eastern neighbour thus continued to be followed with great interest.

Indeed, it took some time before someone explained to me why Muslim actors like Dilip Kumar and Meena Kumari had to take non-Muslim names.

Episodes that dealt with the Mughal period were generally watched with nostalgia. Cricket duels were keenly listened to, as radio commentary was the only way to follow them. But unlike present times, these were not a matter of life and death. In the same city, when it hosted the National Games, the Indian Punjab was also represented. After the event some Sikhs dropped in to see my father, who at that time was in charge of Central Jail. Over time the legacies of the past had to be shed because the realpolitik overrode.

I may have joined the army in because Ayub Khan had putsched only a year earlier, or because the girls in Government College Lahore, where I was studying, clearly fancied those who showed off in uniform. But after I did, it turned out that I had to appear more often in combat than in my former alma mater. While training for war, we were taught that though we had to fight better than our larger adversary, but must also keep in mind that our enemy too was doing his duty for his country.

And when we saw that both in the and wars, the Indian and the Pakistani armies deliberately spared non-combatants—fighting gentlemanly wars, in other words—mutual respect amongst the two militaries was reinforced—but so did the belief that our countries were not likely to become friends anytime soon. In due course, I went for training and visits abroad, and met our eastern neighbours on neutral ground. That helped me make the best of a bad relationship. Once on a course in the north German town of Hamburg, I bumped into a south Indian professor.

The next day he walked into our apartment with his wife to invite us to his home. When returning the courtesy, I asked him if he had any dietary restrictions. He said that as a Brahmin he was forbidden to eat even eggs. His German spouse, however, assured us that she could make him devour whatever we served. It was during that period that the first Indian officer was to come for the German General Staff Course, and from amongst the alumni I was the first person to be contacted for advice.

Operation Blue Star took place soon after I left. Otherwise I would have tickled one of them that the days of one Singh or the other representing the Indian Army in Germany were over, and I am sure he would have taken it sportingly.

No surprise, therefore, that some of us are bursting with wisdom that can hardly wait to be shared. One of the more useful means to do so would indeed be an exchange amongst key players on the opposite sides—provided of course we were prepared to concede our faults and provide a different narrative, even alternative facts. They speak about their backgrounds as professional intelligence officers, and narrate an episode that not only solidified their friendship but also firmed up their belief that a healthy India and Pakistan relationship has more benefits than downsides.

Setting the scene May 25, Our first set of meetings was in Istanbul, at an upmarket hotel in the historic Old Town. The first time the three of us met was for lunch at the rooftop restaurant, the mild sun pleasantly shining through the windows, the waterfront visible in the distance. General Durrani looked at me intensely, as if to size me up. Peter Jones was even more wary, perhaps the effect of a full plate of Turkish kebab. How did it come about?

Asad Durrani: In my experience, once people believe they are going to get together and exchange their views as professionals, more often than not they have no problem. Also, when we speak and one says—this is how we read a particular situation at the time; and then the other says—well, we were reading it like this. This is of great mutual benefit. For instance, how the other side reacted to a particular development.

Sinha: An example of an eye-opener? Durrani: The Kashmir uprising. I was involved in aspects for a couple of years. When it happened, I was heading Military Intelligence. We were looking for more information. It was not my subject, more for the foreign office or the ISI directorate. Such people had known about commotion in Kashmir. It, of course, went on longer than expected. He was asked to do something about it, manage it as well as possible, and that focus continued.

That continuity of personalities, of knowledge and experience, and probably also of policy. On our side, the Pakistani side, most of the time we dealt with the development from event to event, as a person saw it fit, not clear till late what actually happened, how far it would go.

It was not a complete surprise, one knew about him and the tenures on the other side. I remember in MI someone told me that on the Jammu side there was a lieutenant colonel posted there for years, I forget his assignment. I was tempted to recruit him. He probably knew more about us than our own people did because they changed so often.

That may be peculiar to the system. Sinha: What do you hope for from this book? The second was a paper published by the University of Ottawa on Kashmir in , and it was encouraging. Indians and Pakistanis were there, including some Pakistani academics and others with whom I once spent an evening. And we thought someone with a similar background might do a similar project.

Amarjit Singh Dulat: We had done two papers. As General Saheb says, when professionals meet they exchange views. I agree, there has to be a comfort level.

We have different types of personalities. Our backgrounds are different, apart from being from the intelligence agencies. But there are commonalities also. I realised he can be laid-back.

I thought I was the only one who was laid-back. It gives you comfort. I wanted to talk our kind of business. I actually said this. If you had told us, we might have arranged it. We co-chaired a session on terrorism. Dulat: I wanted to say things but it was my first time.

I wanted to be more truthful than we normally are, but found myself waffling. And when he spoke, he spoke so directly, about proxies, and how they were legitimate for every intelligence agency. What did you do in Bangladesh? What was the Mukti Vahini?

General Saheb said these sessions would go on, but that the three of us should talk separately. The three of us sat down with glasses of whiskey and started talking. More openly and honestly. I was surprised by the things he said. And for a former ISI chief to be talking candidly. Even Vicky was pleasantly surprised.

After the second meeting Vicky went off to greener pastures in Europe. We were left by ourselves, a certain relationship built. For instance, if Mumbai8 happened again, there would be an understanding that India had to retaliate. And that it could be managed. It was interesting.

Here was a former ISI chief with a considerable reputation, suggesting how to choreograph surgical strikes. How can a person get more candid? The ISI is supposed to have the most difficult rogues. I have gotten to know General Saheb over a period of time and he has surprised me more and more. These sessions went on. It was in that session that Peter Jones9 made a suggestion that we write something. Durrani: A joint paper. Dulat: We wrote a joint paper on intelligence cooperation.

It was published simultaneously in the Hindu and in Dawn. Then Peter suggested we do a Kashmir paper. That is now on the University of Ottawa website. Sinha: What was the reaction to your joint paper? Durrani: American academic Stephen P. Cohen sent a message that he was very impressed by our paper on intelligence cooperation.

I got emails from elsewhere. Sinha: What do the governments say about such meetings or papers? Durrani: Not a word. Dulat: Same on our side. And because General Saheb is internationally renowned, Stephen Cohen may have called him, but nobody called me!

What do they know? Having messed up royally in their own time, they want to have a joint anti-terror mechanism and a joint intelligence? They want another paradigm? Unless what they say supports existing government policy, they will not get due attention. Rarely is a report seen and is the basis for help. Dulat: Absolutely right, Sir. These are almost government think-tanks. Sinha: They uphold the status quo. General Saheb, after interacting with a few chiefs from the other side, do you see Mr Dulat as representative of Indian spooks or is he a maverick?

We are all different in our own ways, but he is different in a number of ways. First of all, his hands-on experience. That he was a former IB man coming to head RAW and that he was accepted means his approach was different. I know institutions resist outsiders gatecrashing their domain.

They would like to show that this intruder fails. Otherwise, inducting outsiders might become the norm. I know from personal experience, and also within the military. You may manage Kashmir or muddle through it but finally one will have to find a lasting solution. My assessment, though, is that we are not likely to do anything that much different, not because we are stuck in a groove but because we have settled conclusions as State policy that we try and make last as long as possible.

My own experience in intelligence was limited, just three and a half years, so he may have more narrative to add, I have less. But we have come to certain conclusions that masla yeh hai and perhaps that can help shift the focus from the usual rut and provide a way forward. Some may be sceptical about the things we come up with, but even if a few thoughts start making sense to them, then it could percolate to decision-makers.

To understand Kashmir you have to empathise with Kashmir, you have to have a heart to try and see what is happening. Kashmir took me to Pakistan. And in trying to figure out Pakistan, that took me to Afghanistan. And looking at Afghanistan, I find so many similarities with Kashmir. Pakistani writer Ahmed Rashid once said that if we can sort out Kashmir, Afghanistan would be a cakewalk.

Kashmir leads you to Central Asia as well. When I look at the world I find there is a lot to learn from what is happening in Kashmir. General Saheb once mentioned the Palestinian problem. The interesting thing is that news about our association has travelled in Kashmir. A few Kashmiris say to me that one way out of this whole thing is to get a couple of Indians who understand Kashmir together with a few former ISI chiefs, and the first name always mentioned is General Saheb.

They say if you give us a chance to sit with you guys, we can find a way out. He knows that this cannot happen without Pakistan. Now even the mainstream is coming to the same conclusion.

Mufti Saheb10 used to say this. Sinha: Since General Saheb mentioned the book, you received criticism for it and for saying that money played a part in Kashmir, though that may not be a secret to a professional. Dulat: You were determined to send me to Tihar jail! When it came out, like the General said, nobody said a word to me. Officially, directly. But I could sense that the establishment was not happy. And there were people who were critical.

Not directly. Like you heard. What is the big deal about money? This became a big thing for everyone. Senior journalist Harinder Baweja took me to lunch just to get me to talk about money.

Money is a given all over the world. Durrani: Chuckles. Dulat: I said it in a certain context, that after I left government and the PMO in , some blamed me for everything that went wrong in Kashmir. A senior, senior officer said I bribed my way through Kashmir. Or tell me of a better way of doing it? Before you met Mr Dulat, had either of you met counterparts from the opposite agency?

Did you picture them to have horns and tails, for example? Asad Durrani: My entry to intelligence was accidental. I was not trained for this work. I was a normal line officer with a reasonably good career. Otherwise, the post is an open one. Do you know who cleared me for the posting ultimately?

I was a senior instructor at the Command and Staff College, for us a prized position. When my name came up for the Germany posting, it had to be cleared by various agencies. Durrani: Quite possible. You never know with these in-laws! I was not spying in Germany. The hosts knew me, I would go and get information from them. At times, I even got exclusive briefings.

I returned to Pakistan and resumed my career as a line officer. That was a bolt from the blue. The move to ISI was also accidental. Just because I was in MI for two years, as a manager of that branch and from the military, doing military assessments on the military front, they grabbed hold of me. I spent nearly 18 months at the ISI. Sinha: What was your image of intelligence work before you went to Germany? Durrani: Any normal person, in Pakistan or in India or elsewhere, is wary of anyone in the spook business.

God knows what else these intelligence chaps are up to, they move covertly, quietly and surreptitiously. So be careful. When I was in the business I said good heavens. We were assessing threats to the country, external and external-sponsored threats, trying to warn the relevant quarters that these threats are developing, these are the dangerous ones.

Certain aspects of intelligence should be handled by specialists. Previously there were reservations, and this apprehension was not misplaced, that professionals in this business would acquire the form or character of a mafia, and become a brotherhood. And then, leave aside the country, everyone else in the environment is threatened. But I went ahead with it. One thing that happens is collateral damage. Some would even blackmail: look I caught you with a girl, nothing to do with national security, but since one has come to know about this extra-marital relationship one can nail that chap.

These things happen. This is not our main task and if it happens, it has to be resolved. But it makes people see intelligence as something to be shunned. If people think they will get exploited and misused, they get scared.

Sinha: You also served under Nawaz Sharif? People can talk about chemistry or about his way of looking at things. It just did not work out. I also thought he was paranoid about certain things. Since I served as a two-star general it was supposed to be a stopgap arrangement.

Sharif had had his doubts about me, but his expectations suddenly changed and he now thought he had his man. It was an example of the flawed perception that civilian politicians had of how affiliations and loyalties in the services work.

You can be fond of someone but when it comes to work you are loyal to the institution. That still remains a plus point for us, and on many different levels. We had worked hard. The foreign office may have led that particular strategy and we supported it.

But he did not hold it against us. In fact, once his own assessment went wrong, he actually almost publicly admitted he was wrong.

So six months later, he found an opportunity and appointed his man. I left. It was good for me, I went back to the mainstream. I was happy during that period, and then went on to National Defence College. If any of us gets an all-arms appointment, it was a feather in the cap. Durrani: There is one thing that Indians share, whether they are friendly towards Pakistan or hostile: nothing gives them greater pleasure than if a former ISI man can be put on the mat. Twice this was the case: in at the Pugwash Conference in Delhi, and at the Tehelka meeting in London.

I found them a good bunch, Tarun Tejpal and his sister, their father being a former fauji. But on stage, on both occasions, when they asked me to say something, it was usually that I must have been sending infiltrators into India. How do you avoid that embarrassment, or how do you defend it? I made light of it saying, you people misunderstood. We were not sending infiltrators, we were sending people because your visa regime is so rigid, we were sending them for people-to-people contacts.

Go and meet them! Go and talk to them! That was when Mr Dulat and some colleagues rescued my son Osman who was stranded in India, in May He sounded a bit desperate. Durrani: Osman was in Kochi, on behalf of the company he works for. The way that the Japanese do it.

The crux is: my son was here on a Pakistani passport. And people in Kochi were fascinated by him. They were very glad to see a Pakistani because they had never seen one before. And these were not Urdu speakers; there he spoke English.

Someone told him, next time bring your wife and family. On this visit he finished up his work in four-five days. He thought of taking a flight from Mumbai. The office people in Kochi sent him to Mumbai not due to bloody-mindedness but out of ignorance. They did not know that if a person came with a Pakistani passport he had to follow a certain procedure: he had to leave via the city his visa allowed.

They were only used to handling German passport holders, do their registration and fly away. At the Mumbai airport, however, the immigration officials said your visa is only for Kochi, what are you doing in Mumbai? And he was sent away from the airport. Dulat: Possibly because it happened in Mumbai it was easier for us to help out than it would have been in Delhi.

General Saheb was unusually worried and kept inquiring whether it was safe for Osman to stay in Mumbai or whether he should return to Kochi. Durrani: Osman was stuck in some office for three to four hours where no one wanted to deal with him. It was a normal subcontinental bureaucratic office, where whenever he said I have been referred to this gentleman they would say, saheb toh seat par nahin hain.

Twice this happened that a name was given to him and they said the officer is not in his seat. We were in a panic because we did not know what would happen. Even his taxi driver had a good idea what was happening because he stayed outside for four hours with his luggage in the cab. A porter advised him to go back to Kochi, we know about this thing about leaving the way you came.

Dulat: The General called me six to seven times the next day, often asking the same thing: should I send him back to Kochi? You believe in Allah and I have full faith in Waheguru, all will be well. I got a hold of Jeevan Virkar, an old friend from the IB. We were in the same social circle, so he was a friend throughout. I called Jeevan and said, bhai yeh karna hai. He promised to sort it out. Durrani: A few things happened during this to and fro that could only be sorted out by this cyber-savvy generation.

You may never have gone there! The man at the desk asked Osman what flight to Munich he would be taking.

Then he showed them the reservation and they were satisfied. It was a combination of his cyber expertise, good luck and help from Dulat and Co. For 24 hours he had been on the phone, and a thing that was declared impossible was pulled off for him. Durrani: After this episode his company insisted he take a German passport.

Now, with his wife and two daughters Osman has helped retard the decline in the German population. The Supreme Being had rescued Osman. But the best part of his response, which made me extremely happy, was his reference to General Saheb. They assess the activities of other intelligence agencies, particularly of the US, England, Russia and Germany.

Since the tape recorder is off, a few other retired spychiefs land in the room, their lubricated tongues loosen and the jokes begin to fly. It may now be revealed that spies allow themselves a certain degree of bawdiness in a fraternal atmosphere. Asad Durrani: Many intelligence agencies have been called the Deep State. The very nomenclature indicates that it is invisible yet influential. Deep State, incidentally, is also making life miserable for President Donald Trump, preventing him from improving relations with Russia or fulfilling his election promises to disengage from foreign military ventures.

At some stage the ISI probably learnt about it and he was handed over to the US according to a mutually agreed process. Perhaps we are the ones who told the Americans isko le jao, we are going to feign ignorance. Dulat: Our assessment is the same. That he was handed over by Pakistan. Durrani: It was pretty uncomfortable for us. Whatever goes wrong in India is attributed to the ISI. Now everything is blamed on liberals and intellectuals, not on ISI.

Durrani: Quite distrustful. On critical matters the ISI will often impose itself simply because it needs a decision. Some think the ISI is powerful enough to order everyone to fall in line. Even if that were true, the ISI would not get civilian cooperation unless they were willing. When the ISI focuses on one thing, they have the manpower and capability to do it in many kinds of ways. The organisation was developed, and given plenty of resources and support because the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan.

Otherwise it would never have had the wherewithal that a country facing so many threats, external and internal, would get. It still remained short and had to focus on quality. It could not afford much manpower and had to make do with less. It developed a reputation for efficiency.

It also developed a reputation because many people did not like what the ISI did, due to clashing interests.

One example was after the Soviets left, the United States became uneasy: now that the job is done, how do we cut the ISI down to size before it becomes too big for its boots. It was my assessment that the CIA highly exaggerated the threat. We hardly had any assets on the ground and required a hard-nosed, cold-blooded, methodical assessment.

The CIA deliberately overblew the threat either to oblige its political masters who were raring for war, or to play safe with dubious satellite images. I have said this in a piece published in the Atlantic a few years ago: the next time you want to sex up the WMD threat in Iraq, as happened in , and if the ISI says, nonsense, you should be worried. These things created the ISI profile.

Larger than life? Probably a little exaggerated. The ISI had to juggle many balls. You people probably did things more discreetly. You could afford to: you had time, we at times were in a hurry. We felt threatened to the extent that we opted for immediate results. One can lose the basic principle of doing things coolly, deliberately, for the long haul. Dulat: The ISI chief was the last word, he could say anything and get away with it. Right or wrong.

He had to be right if he was saying so. Our guys were more circumspect in an assessment, which was supposed to be more serious. Yahya Khan2 went ahead and held the election because the intelligence agencies told him it would be a hung outcome and his regime would thus continue. When I headed ISI, people reported assessments and likely turnout for the election. The results showed the PPP was decimated.

So much for that assessment. When it comes to grassroots intelligence, however, the police are more effective. For example, the Lal Masjid5 episode in which many children and women were victims of a massacre. I believe it was a disaster. It was badly handled by the authorities: wrong force used, wrong means. They operate stealthily, and would have nabbed the militants while saving the innocent. But they sent the Rangers instead, who burnt down the place.

That incident gave rise to suicide bombers. A couple of weeks later I was in Rawalpindi. These garrison towns have photography studios and tailor shops where military people go, have a uniform tailored and get a photograph taken. I went to the well-known Bhatti studios, as on many occasions, and an SHO walks in. A single SHO could have gone in, seen how many militants were there, and then probably bribed a few or probably got a hold of the family members of a few of them and used them to release hostages.

And before we know it, the militants would have been taken care of. But the government did not trust the effectiveness of the police. Then the Peshawar school incident,6 which was a nasty one. The intelligence agencies had been warned that a big place would be hit, but which one of the hundreds?

That type of near-time information is more useful. The mighty ISI will say, who will implement it? All we can do is ensure the police remain effective. And chief of the ISI.

Durrani: Hamid Gul was my predecessor, though not my immediate one. I have known Hamid ever since we were both lieutenant colonels. He was a professional intelligence man. Very brainy. Read a lot. And his forte was that he would try and hypothesise things, put them in a particular context. His presentation was always impressive. Knowledge of history, etc. If he became famous later it is because he talked about these theories or hypotheses. Hamid liked to sex things up for the necessary impact.

We were different types of people but remained friends till he died. We agreed on certain things and disagreed on others but were friends. I admired him, and his knowledge, commitment and dedication.

Dulat: Yes. We used to say he was the villain, the godfather, the ultimate. The most interesting thing was that A. Verma8 wrote a piece in the Hindu saying there was a time when Hamid Gul offered peace to us. It was a positive tribute. Verma is a hawk. I was at MI. But he went wrong in Punjab and Sindh; the results were the opposite of what he predicted, by the same margin.

In Sindh, he predicted less for the PPP, they swept. In Punjab, he predicted more seats, they got that many less. It wants to highlight a particular personality or period or contribution. That becomes the problem. What should we do?

Should we get a hold of the man, court martial him, issue a rebuttal? I said, there must be 20 people who have read it but once we do something, people will read it.

But one said, let it be. Whatever you say about the book will never be as effective as the book itself. Also, it was well-written, a foreign chap was involved. Sinha: Since the ISI is part of the military, can people enter at higher levels without a military background?

Durrani: We had a handicap in this regard. There is experience and continuity in the IB, Special Branches, police. ISI made its name for different reasons—Afghanistan, military rule—but it has a certain personnel problem.

This was not unusual. It is a gap, though the military sees it as movement within the force. The interesting part happened when he fell afoul of the political leadership. They made him stay at home, but gave him his pay, and he kept silent, pursuing leisure like reading, writing, etc. This would not have happened in the military. One more thing. Back in , Amanullah Gilgiti11 was leading his people for the October march from Muzaffarabad to Chakothi on the Line of Control.

I went along. Durrani: The first thing I was involved in when I entered the intelligence business was the Maldives invasion. Thereafter Rajiv Gandhi14 enforced a weapons embargo. We may have had wishes for a long time, but this was when one started looking at it. How do we make use of this?

With some colleagues I said, what would General Zia have done? We agreed that Zia would have been proactive. People would have been seen doing something—statements, visiting, calling the ambassador, the works.

So I went and looked up the Nepalese ambassador. Kathmandu usually posted retired military chiefs as ambassadors. In those days a couple of military men had followed one another.

The Sri Lankans also did that. I went and asked him, how could we help? Sinha: They had a military man because of Zia? Durrani: Probably.

For me, it was a development in Indian backwaters, how can we make use of it? Dulat: How can we exploit it? Durrani: The Kathmandu dinner we three had, I asked our host despite your presence, whether India makes the Nepalese unhappy. He said, yes, of course. Because here is a big country, India, with hegemonic ambitions. They like prevailing on us, telling us what type of system we should have, whether or not it is good for us.

That we could be a part of India, a big province, benignly, positively. What is it they did to Sikkim? User icon An illustration of a person's head and chest. Sign up Log in. Web icon An illustration of a computer application window Wayback Machine Texts icon An illustration of an open book. Books Video icon An illustration of two cells of a film strip. Video Audio icon An illustration of an audio speaker. Audio Software icon An illustration of a 3.

Software Images icon An illustration of two photographs. Images Donate icon An illustration of a heart shape Donate Ellipses icon An illustration of text ellipses.

EMBED for wordpress. Want more? Advanced embedding details, examples, and help!