The communication age connecting and engaging pdf download

While law enforcement agencies were among the early adopters of information technology, the agencies involved in intelligence gathering and analysis have often been the generators of technological innovation. Many of the technologies that are used to gather, sift, and collate data were developed initially by the intelligence agencies either for the purposes of cryptography or to allow them to sift through the vast amounts of information that they gather to find patterns for interpretation.

Moreover, many of the concepts of computer security, used to ensure that only those with the appropriate rights can access sensitive information, have been leveraged from developments that trace back to the intelligence or defense communities. There is considerable uncertainty outside the intelligence community about the true nature and extent of national capabilities in these areas. Many of those concerned about protecting privacy rights assume that the technology being used for intelligence purposes has capabilities far above technology available to the public.

Rightly or wrongly, it is often assumed that the intelligence community can defeat any privacy-enhancing technology that is available to the general public, and has a capability of gathering and collating information that is far beyond any that is commercially available. Given the secret nature of the national security endeavor, this assumption is understandably neither confirmed nor denied by either those intelligence-gathering groups themselves or the governmental bodies that are supposed to oversee those groups.

Analysis of the limitations on national security-based data gathering is complicated by the distinction between U. Some constitutional rights extend to all persons; thus, the Supreme Court ruled as early as and has repeatedly reaffirmed as recently as that aliens could invoke the equal protection clause against invidious discrimination as readily as could U. The reaffirmation is found in Plyler v.

Doe , U. The problem arises with respect to rights and liberties that are neither expressly confined to citizens nor available alike to citizens and aliens. In fact, most of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights fall into this third category, leading to intense debate over such issues as whether a lawfully resident alien may be deported for advocacy or political activity for which a citizen could not be punished under the First Amendment.

Limited precedent may be cited on both sides of that debate, and the issue is one that the Supreme Court seems consciously to have avoided. When it comes to information gathering, even citizens have few rights to object to the placement of their sensitive personal information into a government database, regardless of whether the information is obtained legally or illegally. If that is true for citizens, it is at least equally true for non-citizens, even those who have long and lawfully resided in the United States.

Moreover, a non-citizen who is not physically present in this country—even though formerly a lawful resident—has severely attenuated legal claims as, for example, would have been the fate of the Guantanamo detainees absent the agreement between the United States and Cuba that gave the naval base quasi-domestic status. Thus, the grounds on which a non-citizen might object to information gathering and data storage in the interests of national security seem remote.

The issues of focus for this report are those that might be raised by U. And as a practical matter, the committee is concerned only about information gathering within the United States i. The distinction between the rights of citizens and those of others matches the perception and, perhaps, the historical reality that the gravest national security threats originate beyond our borders.

Until rela-. Ambach v. Norwick , U. Foley v. Connelie , U. In Bartnicki et al. Vopper , S. Since it would be hard to argue that any information broadcast on the radio waves to the public is somehow private, it would seem that the contents of the audio recording could in fact be placed into a government database—even if the contents had been obtained illegally. How far the precedent of Bartnicki et al.

Vopper extends remains to be seen. Under this premise, if actions of U. That precept was recently reinforced when the Department of the Army formally apologized for having interrogated participants at a University of Texas conference on women and Islam, making clear in the apology that any such inquiry should have been handled by the FBI and not by the military or for that matter the Central Intelligence Agency.

This division of labor partly reflects the difficulty of distinguishing legitimate and protected dissent from genuine security threats, and an abiding fear that government power of inquiry could be abused if the more secretive U.

In this regard, as with the limits placed on the law enforcement agencies, the United States is somewhat different from other countries. Outside the United States, it is common for a country to have a domestic intelligence service whose job it is to accumulate information on citizens and those within the borders of the country for the purposes of national security.

There have been times that some parts of the U. Further, when such activities were undertaken, they were often undertaken as an adjunct activity for a law enforcement agency such as the FBI rather than as part of the activity of an organization whose primary charter was the gathering of domestic intelligence for the purpose of national security. As noted in Section 4. FISA establishes a special court of 11 federal district court judges who review requests for warrants.

These warrants can cover electronic surveillance including wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping and covert physical searches. To obtain a warrant, law enforcement authorities must demonstrate to the FISA Court that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the warrant is an agent of a foreign power. Unlike standard search warrants. While FISA warrants cannot be granted for the purpose of criminal prosecution, information obtained secondarily via a FISA warrant has been allowed in criminal trials.

Since the intelligence process depends on gathering information, one premise of the current system is that the entities whose information is being obtained do not know the extent of what is known about them or the sources of that information.

Thus the FISA law forbids any person upon whom a FISA Court subpoena is served from disclosing that fact to anyone other than a colleague or subordinate whose involvement is vital to obtain the subpoenaed information.

While judicial approval of the FISA Court is required for national security searches, the proceedings of that court and even the identity of its members are secret.

The substantive standard required for issuance of such a secret warrant is also said to be far lower than for a regular warrant, requiring no specific evidence of actual complicity in or even specific contribution to any terrorist activity. Non-disclosure orders are not unique to FISA.

These laws include 12 U. Traditionally, as noted in the previous section, the separation between intelligence gathering for national security purposes and law enforcement surveillance has served to protect the privacy at least of U.

Gathering information on such persons had been generally forbidden except in aid of law enforcement or if a person was determined to be an agent of a foreign power. This meant that the gathering of information could happen only in an attempt to investigate the breaking of a particular law, and the obtaining of information was subject to the kinds of restrictions and third-party judicial reviews that have characterized law enforcement information gathering.

The events of September 11, , and the subsequent efforts to identify, find, and eliminate the threat from both the terrorists directly responsible and others who support groups that have been identified with similar tactics have caused many to call into question the traditional separation of law enforcement and national security intelligence gathering.

National security was traditionally seen as served by gathering information about threats from other countries; suddenly the highest level of threat seemed to be from non-governmental entities.

National security intelligence was gathered from outside the borders of the United States; suddenly the threat seemed to be within those borders as well as without. The domestic collection of information was bound to the prosecution of crimes; suddenly there was a perceived need for the domestic collection of information for intelligence purposes.

The traditional notion of limiting intelligence gathering to outside the borders of the United States and to other than U. This act is seen by its supporters as an overdue response to restrictions on intelligence gathering that had impeded cooperation and collaboration among agencies, and that needed to be relaxed or removed if the nation was to protect itself from the new threats to national security, identified not as other governments but as smaller, non-governmental organizations willing to launch suicide attacks.

Opponents of the act, however, charge that many of its provisions seriously threaten or erode basic rights and liberties enshrined in the Constitution, as well as jeopardizing privacy to an unprecedented degree. One of the difficulties of judging between these two viewpoints is the complexity of the act itself, which is a collection of amendments and additions to other laws rather than a stand-alone act.

In some cases, the act defines limitations on technologies that had not been addressed in law. The act codified the use of trap-and-trace devices and pen registers, already established under long-standing FISA Court practices, for treating electronic communications such as e-mail in a similar way to telephone communications.

In addition, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of provided greater congressional oversight, enhanced procedural protections, more elaborate application requirements, and a judicial review process for the exercise of Section authorities. Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of establishes a judicial review procedure for Section nondisclosure orders that allows recipients of a Section production order to challenge the nondisclosure requirement 1 year after the issuance of the production order.

In response to such a challenge, the FISA Court judge has the discretion to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order, unless the attorney general, deputy attorney general, an assistant attorney general, or the director of the FBI certifies that disclosure may endanger the national. The success of the September 11, , attacks has been seen by many as a result of the distinction drawn between law enforcement and intelligence gathering; in this view if all of the relevant information held by both the law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the intelligence community had been put together and seen correctly, the attacks could have been predicted and stopped.

Not sharing such information was faulted as a reflection of the distinction between law enforcement and intelligence gathering for national security, a distinction that had historically been drawn in part to ensure the privacy of U.

It is in this context that the sharing with law enforcement officials of information derived from intelligence operations has proven controversial. Generally, the concern about such sharing has been that the privacy and other protections embedded in the processes of domestic law enforcement may be circumvented or mooted by the use of intelligence processes that are less subject to such protections.

For example, an airline JetBlue acknowledged a September incident in which it violated its stated privacy policy by sharing personal information on 1. As this writing, the program is still controversial amidst many calls for further investigation. The quest for more and better technologies for analyzing information for national security purposes also raises privacy concerns.

In particular, one common view of the failure to foresee and stop the events of September 11, , is that the failure was not one of a lack of information, but rather a lack of putting together the information that was already available. In this view, better analysis tools are needed more than or in addition to the ability to gather more information. The exact goals of this program are difficult to determine, as they shifted significantly over the time the program was active.

However, the goals were always centered on developing and providing technology that would allow the detection and tracking of terrorist or suspected terrorist activities by aggregating data that are collected by both government and non-government agencies and then mining that data to find patterns of behavior that are highly correlated with future terrorist actions.

A full analysis of the privacy implications of the TIA program has appeared elsewhere and is not repeated here. In addition, the TIA program shows the willingness of these agencies to use or invent technologies that will help them in that undertaking, even when those technologies may be privacy invasive. This report 1 concluded that TIA was a flawed effort to achieve worthwhile ends; 2 argued that although data mining is a vital tool in the fight against terrorism, it could present significant privacy issues if used in connection with personal data concerning U.

In , the president authorized the National Security Agency NSA to begin conducting surveillance of electronic communications in the United States without a court-approved warrant. Since the public became aware of this program late in , 1 many questions have been raised about both its legality and its constitutionality. According to what has been revealed publicly in news reports, the classified NSA program has focused on intercepting, without a warrant, phone calls and e-mails of U.

It is further said to be limited to only domestic-to-international communication; warrants are obtained when both parties in the communication are within U. Although official sources have not provided an authoritative description of the activities and scope of this program, the administration has defended it—and its ability to monitor possible terrorist group activity—as both legal and within the authority granted to the president under the Authorization for Use of Military Force AUMF against al-Qaeda, 2 passed by Congress on September 14, Critics, however, debate the legality and constitutionality of the program that was authorized outside the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISA of , which provides explicit legal guidance on how domestic surveillance can be conducted.

Additionally, the New York Times did not release the story for over a year at the request of the administration for national security concerns. It established procedures for the oversight of domestic surveillance activities conducted by U.

Additionally, the legislation addressed circumstances in which surveillance could be conducted without a warrant, including after a declaration of war for a period of 15 days and in times of emergency when warrants could be obtained ex post facto within 72 hours. Critics argue that changes to domestic surveillance procedures should be authorized by Congress and should take place through amendments to FISA.

A number of analysts have also raised a variety of concerns about the implications of this program and the legal basis used to authorize it. Among the concerns is the reliance on AUMF as a legal basis for electronic domestic surveillance activities, which could also be used to authorize warrantless physical search and seizures. Related questions have been raised in terms of the admissibility in a court of law of information obtained without a warrant.

Reported in USA Today on May 11, , 8 the program supposedly uses these data to analyze calling patterns in an effort to detect terrorist activity. Calling records do not involve the content of the calls themselves, but do include, at a minimum, the originating number, the called number, the duration of the call, and the time of day of the call.

Such records are usually protected less stringently than the content of phone calls, but their disclosure to government authorities has historically entailed an explicit legal authorization, albeit with lower standards of cause, to produce such records.

As in the case of content surveillance, controversy arises because the carriers in question may have provided the records without such authorization in hand. The Total Information Awareness TIA program caused considerable worry among many Americans across the political spectrum, much of it provoked by bad public relations and the political concerns raised over those in charge of the program.

Notably absent from the debate over the TIA program was any discussion of exactly what technology was being sought by the program, and whether or not the technology being sought was actually possible. This was in part due to a constant changing of the goals articulated for the program; it was hard to determine exactly what the technology being developed was supposed to do. But even the various alternatives that were proposed at different times were not examined in the light of their technological possibilities or the repercussions of that technology if it were possible.

This is especially odd given that the agency sponsoring the TIA program, DARPA, is a research agency charged with just this kind of technical evaluation.

A number of the proposed components of the TIA program were never the focus of controversy; these had to do with automated translation aids and tools for standardizing the format of information being gathered by intelligence agencies. More controversial were the proposed tools that would allow discovery of patterns of activity.

These tools would mine a consolidated database built from the information gathered by governmental and non-governmental entities, which would include data on commercial transactions.

In one version of the TIA statement of goals, the analysis tools would scan this database for events or sets of events of interest such as the purchase of one-way rental trucks coupled with the purchase of large amounts of fertilizer and identify persons who had participated in such transactions, allowing those persons to come to the attention of the national security agencies.

Such a system is not technically feasible, however. To aggregate the information from the various sources into a single database would require a solution to the problem of data integration Section 3. Different databases store data in different forms, meaning that the information held in one database cannot be read or manipulated by programs that understand the second database.

To allow a program to use both databases requires some form of data integration, which in turn requires converting one. This problem has existed in industry for the past 40 years; all attempts to solve the problem even on a small scale have succeeded only for very simple aggregations and have proven to be exceptionally expensive.

To hypothesize a single aggregation, whether virtual or physical, of all of the databases, both public and private, as is done in this version of the TIA program, is to hypothesize a general solution to the still-unsolved data integration problem. Even if the data integration problem could be solved, the solution sought by the TIA program would require the ability to evaluate arbitrary sets of events in that database to find patterns.

However, the set of possible events grows at a pace that makes the general evaluation of all of those sets computationally infeasible. The number of sets of events that can be formed from a group of individual events is equal to 2 to the power of the number of events; that is, for 20 different events the number of distinct sets of those events is 2 20 , or more than 1,, different sets of events.

If we were to look at each commercial transaction in the United States as a separate event, the set of possible sets made up of those events is far larger than the number of atoms in the universe. A second version of the TIA goal avoided this problem of computational complexity by stating that the tools would allow analysts to identify a person of interest, and then use the tools to track all of the activities of that person that were traced in all of the databases that had been aggregated.

This approach eliminated the problem of the prior goal by concentrating on a particular subject or set of subjects and picking out the events associated with that subject. By starting with a subject of interest, the events in the database could be examined individually to see if they involved that individual, thus keeping the complexity of the search proportional to the size of the database rather than growing exponentially with the size of the database.

This goal still assumed that the aggregation of databases into a single search set would be possible, but even if only a small number of databases were aggregated, this goal could provide a more complete picture of an individual than could be found in any of the single databases.

The problem with this narrower goal is that, even if it can be achieved, it is unlikely that it will help disrupt terrorist attacks before they are carried out. The ability to find out more information about known persons does not help in the identification of potential terrorists with no previous records of such involvement or other reason to fall under suspicion—and there is no shortage of such individuals in the world.

One problem with such watch lists, as they now appear to be implemented, is that it is difficult to find out if a particular person has been placed on such a list and, if placed on the list, to find out the information that caused that placement. There is no formal mechanism for challenging either the placement on the list or. Even Edward Kennedy, senior senator from Massachusetts, has had problems getting his name off the watch list.

Even if corrective mechanisms were in place, lists such as these suffer from a cluster of problems having to do with establishing the identity of those who are being compared to the list. If a list is kept in terms of names, its usefulness is limited by the fact that a single name can be shared by many different people.

A combination of name and address may be better, but falls prey to the ease with which people move from place to place, and the time lag between such a move and the time at which all relevant records have been updated to reflect the new address. Indeed, such lists seem to presume, contrary to fact, that there is a way or set of ways to uniquely identify each person who might appear on such a list.

There is no such mechanism available today, and establishing such a mechanism is far from simple. In many ways, the tension between privacy and national security parallels the tension between privacy and law enforcement.

Both law enforcement and national security require government to amass large amounts of information about people, including much information that the subject or target might want to keep private and information that will ultimately not prove useful for any mission-related function.

Both law enforcement and national security require that that information be analyzed to try to infer even more about a person. Both are heavy users of technology, and both use technology to gather information, identify individuals, and analyze that information. National security differs from law enforcement, however, in two significant ways.

First, law enforcement authorities are usually though not always called in when a criminal act has been committed, and the criminal act itself serves to focus investigative resources—that is, they tend to be reactive.

National security authorities are most interested in preventing hostile acts from taking place—they tend to be proactive.

Second, most of the information gathered by law enforcement and used to prosecute a person for the violation of a law will eventually be made public, along with the mechanisms used to gather that information. Intelligence gathering. Rachel L. The mechanisms used to gather information, along with the information itself, are not made public, even when the information is used in a way that has an impact on the life of the subject of that information.

This greater need for secrecy makes it unlikely that citizens will be able to discover if the agencies charged with national security are violating their privacy.

The mechanisms for gathering information are often unknown, so those wishing to ensure privacy may not know the techniques against which they must guard. The information gathered must remain secret, and so there is no easy way to know what information is gathered, if that information is accurate, whether it might be subject to different interpretations, or how to correct the information if it is inaccurate or incomplete.

The only thing known with certainty is that there is an entity that is capable of gathering information about foreign governments, and it is reasonable to presume that such an entity can easily gather information about private citizens in the United States.

Because of the secret nature of the information gathered by national security agencies, it can be difficult to establish a trust relationship if one does not already exist between the citizens about whom the information is gathered and the agencies doing the gathering. There are few in the United States who would worry about the gathering of information even within the borders of the United States and about U. How to obtain that assurance is a public policy issue of the utmost importance.

This is why oversight is so important, all the more so in times of crisis. Accountability need not mean indiscriminate transparency; rather, trusted agents such as members of Congress or special commissions should be entrusted with offering, and hopefully can be trusted to offer, needed assurances.

Even before the formation of our nation, government was seen as posing the principal threats to individual privacy. Many of the grievances against the English crown that were detailed in the Declaration of Independence reflected an erosion of the right to be left alone, and many provisions of the Bill of Rights sought to codify limitations on government power which the framers saw as vital to the new nation.

When law enforcement and national security are concerned, the sources of concern about privacy rights are readily apparent. On the one hand, law enforcement must be able to gather information about individuals in order to identify and apprehend suspects and to enforce criminal law and regulatory standards. National security agencies gather and analyze information about individuals and organizations in order to protect and enhance national security. On the other hand, the very process of gathering and using such information may pose serious risks to individual privacy.

A somewhat similar set of tensions apply to data that have already been collected for some purpose other than law enforcement or national security. As noted in earlier chapters, a wide variety of personal information on individuals is collected for a wide variety of purposes by both government agencies e.

In some instances such as survey data collected by the Census Bureau , such information has been collected under a promise, legal or otherwise, that it would be used for a certain purpose and only for that purpose, and would otherwise be kept confidential. Others would argue just as strongly that the legal restrictions in effect at the time of data collection effectively render such data unavailable to the government, legally if not physically.

But in the end, [i]f the defense authorities found Japs missing and they wanted the names of the Japs in that area, I would give them further means of checking individuals. It is not known if the Census Bureau actually provided information on individual Japanese-Americans, but Seltzer and Anderson cite documents indicating that the Census Bureau clearly did provide mesodata i. Indeed, on the Monday after the December 7 attack on Pearl Harbor which occurred on a Sunday , the Census Bureau initiated the production of reports on the distribution of Japanese-Americans across the United States based on macrodata data from the census aggregated in terms of large geographic units.

Seltzer and Anderson note also that the Census Bureau has recognized possible threats to privacy arising from certain kinds of mesodata, and in response has progressively introduced stricter disclosure standards. Indeed, the bureau has indicated that under the standards now in place the release of mesodata from the census on Japanese-Americans would have been severely restricted.

A number of points are worth noting about this example. First, whether or not the Census Bureau provided information on individuals, the use of census data violated the spirit of the confidentiality law in the sense that respondents provided information under promises of confidentiality 33 —information that was subsequently used against them.

No person can be harmed in any way by providing the information required. The census has nothing to do with … the enforcement of any national, state, or local law or ordinance. There need be no fear that any disclosure will be made regarding any individual person or his affairs….

See Thomas F. Issues related to privacy in a law enforcement or national security context are hard for citizens to assess. Citizens are not told what information these agencies are capable of gathering or what they do gather, because that knowledge being made public can limit the very information that agencies will be able to gather.

In addition, the stakes are higher because these agencies can use information they gathered to imprison citizens. Citizens are asked to trust that abuses are not occurring and to trust in the oversight mechanisms that often require one part of the government to ensure that another is not generally overstepping appropriate bounds.

Similarly, law enforcement and national security agencies are put into a difficult position regarding the gathering and analysis of information. If these agencies fail to gather enough information to accomplish their missions, they are faulted for not using the latest techniques and technologies. However, if these agencies are perceived as gathering too much information about ordinary citizens, they are faulted for invasion of privacy.

Unfortunately, it is often impossible to determine, before the fact, who is going to be a law breaker or terrorist in the future.

There is no way for law enforcement and national security agencies to determine about whom they should gather information without requiring that these agencies also know the future. The conundrum is further accentuated by a declaratory national policy that emphasizes prevention of terrorist attacks rather than prosecution or retaliation after they occur. That is, law enforcement activities must take place—successfully—in the absence of the primary event that usually focuses such activities.

With few definitively related clues to guide an investigation, a much more uniform spread of attention must be cast over those who might have some contact or connection, however tenuous, to a possible terrorist event in the future. The best that can be expected is that these agencies put into place the appropriate safeguards, checks, and balances to minimize the possibility that they gather information in an inappropriate way about citizens.

But the more such safeguards are in place, so the argument goes, the more likely it is that mistakes are made in the opposite direction, and that these agencies will miss some piece of information that is vital for the performance of their function. Yet areas of overlap between privacy and law enforcement and national security also exist. For example, citizens who have faith in their government and who believe that it generally follows democratic rules one reflection of which is respect for privacy will be more likely to cooperate with law enforcement in providing information and other forms of support.

An important influence on the process of balancing governmental and societal needs for safety and security and individual privacy is the fact that public safety is—almost by definition—a collective benefit, while government infringements of privacy in the name of public safety tend to affect individuals or relatively small or politically marginal groups of people, at least in the short term.

Under such circumstances, it is easier for public safety officials to dismiss or minimize privacy concerns that their actions might raise. That is, tips about unusual and suspicious behavior are most likely to emerge when the communities in which terrorists are embedded are allied with, or at least not suspicious of, law enforcement authorities—and singling out young men of Middle Eastern origin for special scrutiny is not an approach that will create a large amount of good will in the affected communities.

These tensions have been magnified since the terrorist attacks of September There are many who feel that if the right information had been available, along with the right tools to analyze that information and the right governmental structures that would allow the sharing of the information between law enforcement and national security agencies, those attacks could have been avoided.

Part of the reaction to those attacks was the passing of laws and the creation of policies that made it easier for agencies to collect and share information and the weakening of some traditional checks and balances in the hope of enhancing national security.

At the same time, there is worry that the increasingly sophisticated technology available for surveillance, data sharing and analysis, and data warehousing, when joined with the weakening of rules protecting individual information, will allow law enforcement and national security agencies a vastly expanded and largely unseen ability to monitor all citizens.

The potential for abuse given such an ability is easy to imagine—for example, a law enforcement agency might be able to monitor the group gatherings of citizens objecting to a certain government policy, identifying who they meet with and perhaps what they talk about.

We have listed down the widely used types of Mass Communication from traditional to new media. Must Read: Masters in Mass Communication. Amongst the conventional forms and types of Mass Communication, the print media comprises of those platforms that facilitate communication mainly through written communication such as newspapers, books, journals, etc.

The most crucial change brought to print media is that it has advanced towards online platforms as well since many newspapers have established a strong online presence to keep people updated about the latest happenings across the globe bringing them at the touch of our screens! Must Explore: Types of Journalism. Broadcast Media mainly refers to the electronic broadcast platforms that are amongst the pivotal types of mass communication.

Whether through radio, films or TV shows, this form of mass media carries out the distribution of news, information and entertainment through audio and visuals by implementing electronic broadcasting platforms. Below we have detailed the major three kinds of broadcast media, i. Radio, Film and Television. Radio is one of the oldest types of Mass Communication.

It is a medium through which electromagnetic signals are delivered over long distances. Being a traditional form of Mass Media, radio was earlier used to make news announcements, telecast important events and then it also started broadcasting music as well as entertaining conversational programs. With the digital age, online radio channels have emerged which made it more accessible than FMs that worked on certain frequencies and network connections.

Recommended Read: Radio Jockey Course. When Thomas Edison invented the Kinetoscope by Thomas Edison, the phenomena of motion pictures came into being. It is one of the most popular types of Mass Communication which include both audio-visual aspects of communication. Moving pictures and sounds along with interactive storytelling works in confluence with each other to provide content that is engaging and entertaining.

Moreover, the TV and Film industry is filled with massive career opportunities whether you are a creative writer or an imaginative visualizer.

For those wanting to make a career in this branch of broadcast media, there are a multitude of courses available from Digital Filmmaking to Film Editing as well as Multimedia and Animation and Cinematography courses! One of the underrated yet potential types of Mass Communication, Outdoor media corresponds to the dissemination of information as well as advertising through our outer environments such as billboards, posters, boardings, banners, etc.

This form is utilised to advertise products or services as well as spread social information and awareness to the general public. Quite similar to the outdoor media, Transit Media is more inclined towards advertising through posters, banners, signs and notices in means of transportations such as Buses, Metro, Rail, amongst others.

Check Out: Advertising Courses. Digital Media is one of the recent and popular types of Mass Communication and has become an influential form of media in the present time.

Also referred to as new media, it combines all the attributes of interactive communication as the internet provides quick and easily accessible information in a variety of formats.

It encompasses wide-ranging mediums such as emails, podcasts, blogs, websites, videos, social media, amongst others. Also looking for opportunities to be positive and encouraging is good for the relationship, especially when it is feeling strained. Control your emotions. Count to ten or take some deep breaths before responding. Do things together. Share regular meals.

Sitting down to eat a meal together as a family is another great way to stay close. Dinner conversations give every member of the family a chance to check in and talk casually about sports or television or politics. Kids who feel comfortable talking to parents about everyday things are likely to be more open when harder things come up, too.

One rule: no phones allowed. Be observant. Likewise, take note if he stops wanting to do things that used to make him happy, or if you notice him isolating himself. She may need your help and it could be a sign she needs to talk to a mental health professional. Get this as a PDF. Enter email to download and get news and resources in your inbox. Share this on social.