How does hursthouse define the virtuous woman

Modern virtue ethics takes its inspiration from the Aristotelian understanding of character and virtue. Aristotelian character is, importantly, about a state of being.

For example, the virtue of kindness involves the right sort of emotions and inner states with respect to our feelings towards others. Character is also about doing. Aristotelian theory is a theory of action, since having the virtuous inner dispositions will also involve being moved to act in accordance with them.

Realizing that kindness is the appropriate response to a situation and feeling appropriately kindly disposed will also lead to a corresponding attempt to act kindly. Another distinguishing feature of virtue ethics is that character traits are stable, fixed, and reliable dispositions. If an agent possesses the character trait of kindness, we would expect him or her to act kindly in all sorts of situations, towards all kinds of people, and over a long period of time, even when it is difficult to do so.

A person with a certain character can be relied upon to act consistently over a time. It is important to recognize that moral character develops over a long period of time. People are born with all sorts of natural tendencies. Some of these natural tendencies will be positive, such as a placid and friendly nature, and some will be negative, such as an irascible and jealous nature.

These natural tendencies can be encouraged and developed or discouraged and thwarted by the influences one is exposed to when growing up. Our natural tendencies, the raw material we are born with, are shaped and developed through a long and gradual process of education and habituation.

Moral education and development is a major part of virtue ethics. Moral development, at least in its early stages, relies on the availability of good role models. The virtuous agent acts as a role model and the student of virtue emulates his or her example.

Initially this is a process of habituating oneself in right action. Aristotle advises us to perform just acts because this way we become just. The student of virtue must develop the right habits, so that he tends to perform virtuous acts.

Virtue is not itself a habit. Habituation is merely an aid to the development of virtue, but true virtue requires choice, understanding, and knowledge. Virtue is chosen knowingly for its own sake. The development of moral character may take a whole lifetime. But once it is firmly established, one will act consistently, predictably and appropriately in a variety of situations. Aristotelian virtue is defined in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics as a purposive disposition, lying in a mean and being determined by the right reason.

As discussed above, virtue is a settled disposition. It is also a purposive disposition. A virtuous actor chooses virtuous action knowingly and for its own sake. It is not enough to act kindly by accident, unthinkingly, or because everyone else is doing so; you must act kindly because you recognize that this is the right way to behave. Note here that although habituation is a tool for character development it is not equivalent to virtue; virtue requires conscious choice and affirmation.

Virtue is the appropriate response to different situations and different agents. The virtues are associated with feelings. For example: courage is associated with fear, modesty is associated with the feeling of shame, and friendliness associated with feelings about social conduct. The virtue lies in a mean because it involves displaying the mean amount of emotion, where mean stands for appropriate. This does not imply that the right amount is a modest amount.

Sometimes quite a lot may be the appropriate amount of emotion to display, as in the case of righteous indignation. The mean amount is neither too much nor too little and is sensitive to the requirements of the person and the situation. Finally, virtue is determined by the right reason. Virtue requires the right desire and the right reason. To act from the wrong reason is to act viciously.

On the other hand, the agent can try to act from the right reason, but fail because he or she has the wrong desire. The virtuous agent acts effortlessly, perceives the right reason, has the harmonious right desire, and has an inner state of virtue that flows smoothly into action. The virtuous agent can act as an exemplar of virtue to others.

It is important to recognize that this is a perfunctory account of ideas that are developed in great detail in Aristotle. Modern virtue ethicists have developed their theories around a central role for character and virtue and claim that this gives them a unique understanding of morality.

The emphasis on character development and the role of the emotions allows virtue ethics to have a plausible account of moral psychology—which is lacking in deontology and consequentialism. Virtue ethics can avoid the problematic concepts of duty and obligation in favor of the rich concept of virtue.

Judgments of virtue are judgments of a whole life rather than of one isolated action. In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle warns us that the study of ethics is imprecise. Virtue ethicists have challenged consequentialist and deontological theories because they fail to accommodate this insight.

Both deontological and consequentialist type of theories rely on one rule or principle that is expected to apply to all situations. Because their principles are inflexible, they cannot accommodate the complexity of all the moral situations that we are likely to encounter. We are constantly faced with moral problems.

For example: Should I tell my friend the truth about her lying boyfriend? Should I cheat in my exams? Should I have an abortion? Should I save the drowning baby? Should we separate the Siamese twins? Should I join the fuel protests? All these problems are different and it seems unlikely that we will find the solution to all of them by applying the same rule. If the problems are varied, we should not expect to find their solution in one rigid and inflexible rule that does not admit exception.

If the nature of the thing we are studying is diverse and changing, then the answer cannot be any good if it is inflexible and unyielding. At best, for virtue ethics, there can be rules of thumb—rules that are true for the most part, but may not always be the appropriate response. The doctrine of the mean captures exactly this idea. The virtuous response cannot be captured in a rule or principle, which an agent can learn and then act virtuously.

Knowing virtue is a matter of experience, sensitivity, ability to perceive, ability to reason practically, etc. As a result some virtue ethicists see themselves as anti-theorists, rejecting theories that systematically attempt to capture and organize all matters of practical or ethical importance.

Virtue ethics initially emerged as a rival account to deontology and consequentialism. It developed from dissatisfaction with the notions of duty and obligation and their central roles in understanding morality. It also grew out of an objection to the use of rigid moral rules and principles and their application to diverse and different moral situations. Virtue ethics is character-based.

Raising objections to other normative theories and defining itself in opposition to the claims of others, was the first stage in the development of virtue ethics. Virtue ethicists then took up the challenge of developing full fledged accounts of virtue that could stand on their own merits rather than simply criticize consequentialism and deontology.

These accounts have been predominantly influenced by the Aristotelian understanding of virtue. There are three main strands of development for virtue ethics: Eudaimonism, agent-based theories and the ethics of care.

Aristotle recognizes that actions are not pointless because they have an aim. Every action aims at some good. Furthermore, some things are done for their own sake ends in themselves and some things are done for the sake of other things means to other ends. Aristotle claims that all the things that are ends in themselves also contribute to a wider end, an end that is the greatest good of all.

That good is eudaimonia. Aristotle then observes that where a thing has a function the good of the thing is when it performs its function well. For example, the knife has a function, to cut, and it performs its function well when it cuts well. This argument is applied to man: man has a function and the good man is the man who performs his function well.

Therefore, the function of man is reason and the life that is distinctive of humans is the life in accordance with reason. If the function of man is reason, then the good man is the man who reasons well. This is the life of excellence or of eudaimonia.

The importance of this point of eudaimonistic virtue ethics is that it reverses the relationship between virtue and rightness. A utilitarian could accept the value of the virtue of kindness, but only because someone with a kind disposition is likely to bring about consequences that will maximize utility.

So the virtue is only justified because of the consequences it brings about. In eudaimonist virtue ethics the virtues are justified because they are constitutive elements of eudaimonia that is, human flourishing and wellbeing , which is good in itself. Rosalind Hursthouse developed one detailed account of eudaimonist virtue ethics.

Hursthouse argues that the virtues make their possessor a good human being. All living things can be evaluated qua specimens of their natural kind. Like Aristotle, Hursthouse argues that the characteristic way of human beings is the rational way: by their very nature human beings act rationally, a characteristic that allows us to make decisions and to change our character and allows others to hold us responsible for those decisions.

Acting virtuously—that is, acting in accordance with reason—is acting in the way characteristic of the nature of human beings and this will lead to eudaimonia. This means that the virtues benefit their possessor. One might think that the demands of morality conflict with our self-interest, as morality is other-regarding, but eudaimonist virtue ethics presents a different picture.

Human nature is such that virtue is not exercised in opposition to self-interest, but rather is the quintessential component of human flourishing. The good life for humans is the life of virtue and therefore it is in our interest to be virtuous. It is not just that the virtues lead to the good life e.

It is important to note, however, that there have been many different ways of developing this idea of the good life and virtue within virtue ethics.

Philippa Foot, for example, grounds the virtues in what is good for human beings. Rather than being constitutive of the good life, the virtues are valuable because they contribute to it. Another account is given by perfectionists such as Thomas Hurka, who derive the virtues from the characteristics that most fully develop our essential properties as human beings.

Individuals are judged against a standard of perfection that reflects very rare or ideal levels of human achievement. The virtues realize our capacity for rationality and therefore contribute to our well-being and perfection in that sense. Not all accounts of virtue ethics are eudaimonist. Michael Slote has developed an account of virtue based on our common-sense intuitions about which character traits are admirable. Slote makes a distinction between agent-focused and agent-based theories.

Agent-focused theories understand the moral life in terms of what it is to be a virtuous individual, where the virtues are inner dispositions. Aristotelian theory is an example of an agent-focused theory. By contrast, agent-based theories are more radical in that their evaluation of actions is dependent on ethical judgments about the inner life of the agents who perform those actions.

There are a variety of human traits that we find admirable, such as benevolence, kindness, compassion, etc. Finally, the Ethics of Care is another influential version of virtue ethics. Developed mainly by feminist writers, such as Annette Baier, this account of virtue ethics is motivated by the thought that men think in masculine terms such as justice and autonomy, whereas woman think in feminine terms such as caring.

These theorists call for a change in how we view morality and the virtues, shifting towards virtues exemplified by women, such as taking care of others, patience, the ability to nurture, self-sacrifice, etc.

These virtues have been marginalized because society has not adequately valued the contributions of women. Writings in this area do not always explicitly make a connection with virtue ethics.

There is much in their discussions, however, of specific virtues and their relation to social practices and moral education, etc. There are many different accounts of virtue ethics.

The three types discussed above are representative of the field. There is a large field, however, of diverse writers developing other theories of virtue. For example, Christine Swanton has developed a pluralist account of virtue ethics with connections to Nietzsche. Swanton develops an account of self-love that allows her to distinguish true virtue from closely related vices, e. She also makes use of the Nietzschean ideas of creativity and expression to show how different modes of acknowledgement are appropriate to the virtues.

Historically, accounts of virtue have varied widely. Homeric virtue should be understood within the society within which it occurred. Other accounts of virtue ethics are inspired from Christian writers such as Aquinas and Augustine see the work of David Oderberg. To possess a virtue is to have the will to apply it and the knowledge of how to do so. The three types of theories covered above developed over long periods, answering many questions and often changed in response to criticisms.

For example, Michael Slote has moved away from agent-based virtue ethics to a more Humean-inspired sentimentalist account of virtue ethics. Humean accounts of virtue ethics rely on the motive of benevolence and the idea that actions should be evaluated by the sentiments they express.

Admirable sentiments are those that express a concern for humanity. The interested reader must seek out the work of these writers in the original to get a full appreciation of the depth and detail of their theories. Much of what has been written on virtue ethics has been in response to criticisms of the theory. The following section presents three objections and possible responses, based on broad ideas held in common by most accounts of virtue ethics.

Morality is supposed to be about other people. It deals with our actions to the extent that they affect other people. Moral praise and blame is attributed on the grounds of an evaluation of our behavior towards others and the ways in that we exhibit, or fail to exhibit, a concern for the well-being of others.

Morality requires us to consider others for their own sake and not because they may benefit us. There seems to be something wrong with aiming to behave compassionately, kindly, and honestly merely because this will make oneself happier.

Related to this objection is a more general objection against the idea that well-being is a master value and that all other things are valuable only to the extent that they contribute to it.

This line of attack, exemplified in the writings of Tim Scanlon, objects to the understanding of well-being as a moral notion and sees it more like self-interest. Furthermore, well-being does not admit to comparisons with other individuals. Thus, well-being cannot play the role that eudaimonists would have it play. This objection fails to appreciate the role of the virtues within the theory. The virtues are other-regarding. Kindness, for example, is about how we respond to the needs of others.

The eudaimonist account of virtue ethics claims that the good of the agent and the good of others are not two separate aims. Both rather result from the exercise of virtue. Rather than being too self-centered, virtue ethics unifies what is required by morality and what is required by self-interest. Moral philosophy is concerned with practical issues. Fundamentally it is about how we should act.

Virtue ethics has criticized consequentialist and deontological theories for being too rigid and inflexible because they rely on one rule or principle. One reply to this is that these theories are action guiding.

As long as we know the principles, we can apply them to practical situations and be guided by them. Virtue ethics, it is objected, with its emphasis on the imprecise nature of ethics, fails to give us any help with the practicalities of how we should behave.

A theory that fails to be action-guiding is no good as a moral theory. The main response to this criticism is to stress the role of the virtuous agent as an exemplar. Virtue ethics reflects the imprecise nature of ethics by being flexible and situation-sensitive, but it can also be action-guiding by observing the example of the virtuous agent.

The virtuous agent is the agent who has a fully developed moral character, who possesses the virtues and acts in accordance with them, and who knows what to do by example. Further, virtue ethics places considerable of emphasis on the development of moral judgment. Knowing what to do is not a matter of internalizing a principle, but a life-long process of moral learning that will only provide clear answers when one reaches moral maturity.

Virtue ethics cannot give us an easy, instant answer. This is because these answers do not exist. Rules versus outcome. So what does virtue mean? Start using words like good and bad, right and wrong, and you introduce the assumption that we can identify and agree on such things. This is why virtue ethics is so contentious - and why it's increasingly popular. For decades, even centuries, philosophers had embraced subjectivism, doing away with the absolutes of rights and wrongs.

If we're motivated by rules and outcomes, why waste time debating rights and wrongs? But when questions of morality and happiness, of how a person should live and behave socially grew in urgency through the 20th century, Hursthouse says deontology and utilitarianism were found wanting.

One suggestion is that the rediscovery of virtue ethics was prompted by the social challenges coming out of the US - the civil rights movement, Vietnam protests and feminism.

Hursthouse is frustrated that the rest of us have been slow to catch on. She's critical of "the kind of galloping subjectivism we have nowadays when people have got so self-conscious they can't even say wrong. They say inappropriate. Hursthouse doesn't buy that.

For all her jolly ways, she enters a debate with her mental weaponry well-sharpened. She says that in any particular situation, "there's going to be at least one correct and an awful lot of incorrect ways to act. And I also don't believe that when you push them, anybody really believes that. Try them. Say something like, 'so you mean if you felt like raping someone that would be ok? Sure, we would all be able to agree that rape is wrong, but aren't there less extreme examples that people would disagree on?

Isn't virtue in the eye of the beholder? In fact one way to get people to realise is just to say write down the characteristics that you would aspire to have yourself or that you would like your children to have. In contrast, write down the characteristics that you despise yourself for having. Kindness, honesty, courage, compassion But the vices offer more scope. What about greed? Most would say that's a vice, but some say 'greed is good'. You won't get many people saying that.

Instead, people immediately start looking for a virtue term that everyone will agree on, like self-reliance. While we might have widespread consensus on what the virtues and vices are, that does not equate to consensus on how we judge and apply them. For example, we all might agree that killing another human is a vice.

In the context of war it's a virtue. The crucial point, Hursthouse says, is that it all depends on circumstance.

Surely it was one of the most vicious acts of our time. While not defending the attack, Hursthouse says it depends on how you judge that circumstance. And that's exactly the debate. We are entitled to view all of America, due to the huge amount it consumes, as living off us and inflicting starvation on us. We are allowed to go to war to defend yourself against starvation. Now I'm agin' it myself, but that's a perfectly well-structured argument. The bigger the numbers involved, the more circumstances to consider.

Disagreement on which course to take is certain to arise and national leaders have particular obligations that might steer them away from virtuosity. Further, in a democracy we follow those most popular with the majority, not the most virtuous. What this circumstantial view means is that there's no golden rule and one prescribed choice or action that will always be virtuous.

Hursthouse says that conclusion disappoints some people, who want their morality cut and dried. I came to moral philosophy to be given direction. My father and mother were both happy to argue the hind leg off a donkey at the drop of a hat. In fact in our kitchen we used to keep all these reference books so that as soon as a good argument at the dinner table foundered on some boring fact, we could leap up, consult the books, settle the fact and get back to the argument.

When she was 18, two years into a BA at Victoria, the family moved to Auckland and she transferred. After completing her masters at Auckland, she headed to Oxford in on a postgraduate scholarship and there she completed a BPhil. Keen to continue on with a DPhil doctor of philosophy , Hursthouse was hoping to get some lecturing work when Corpus Christi, one of the men's colleges in those segregated days, advertised a position.

Well, just by pure accident this time round Corpus happened to word its advertisement in a way it didn't use any pronouns. And my tutor at the time, an absolutely wonderful man called Tony Kenny - at the time a master at Balliol - he said, 'Rosalind, you should put in for this'.

I said, 'You know they only expect men to apply'. And to its credit Corpus bit on the bullet of the fact that I was the best candidate, and appointed me.