How many al qaeda members are there in the world

Resolving the causes that spur recruitment to it - including the Arab-Israeli dispute, the US presence in Iraq and the overall lack of representative political development in the Islamic world - would probably be useful, although not necessarily decisive measures against Al-Qaeda.

The recent history of the Iranian-backed Hizbullah organisation in Lebanon, long regarded as a terrorist group by the US, is an illuminating example. Deprived of a cause, a terrorist group withers away. Al-Qaeda would fare no differently if some of the root causes of conflict in the Middle East were addressed. The US is working closely with its counterparts around the world to track and freeze Al-Qaeda finances to deprive it of its financial resources.

One of the main areas of debate among US counter-terrorist policy-makers is the degree to which they should focus more intently on capturing bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, who are believed to be hiding in South Waziristan or one of the other tribal areas of Pakistan.

It is not even fully known whether the two men still exercise command over Al-Qaeda and its affiliates; there is evidence and strong opinions on both sides of that question. Whether or not they are operationally commanding Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, they and particularly al-Zawahiri have continued to issue taped messages threatening attacks on the US and countries and leaders allied with it. These messages, at the very least, give international financial markets and international leaders the impression that Al-Qaeda could still strike anywhere, at any time and particularly on a timetable calculated to affect Western elections.

Indeed, bin Laden was shown taunting and threatening the US government and electorate in a supposedly new broadcast transmitted four days before the 3 November US presidential election. These messages - and the importance attached to them - are reason enough to believe that capturing bin Laden and al-Zawahiri should be considered a vital part of the effort against Al-Qaeda.

Assuming that such a proposition is widely accepted, it is much more difficult to put into practice. The geographical and political difficulties associated with the perceived approximate locations of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri has been widely noted.

It is certain, however, that the US military and US intelligence community have at their disposal greater capabilities with which to search for these figures than the equivalent Pakistani institutions.

Pakistan has, in general, co-operated with US efforts to locate Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistani cities and tribal areas, the more so after two failed assassination attempts against President Pervez Musharraf in December However, the performance of the Pakistani military against Al-Qaeda forces in engagements around the town of Wana in March - and its inability to systematically and comprehensively search the vast tribal areas - have been less impressive.

Rita Katz is the Executive Director and founder of the SITE Intelligence Group , a non-governmental counterterrorism organization specializing in tracking and analyzing online activity of the global extremist community.

The following is an interview. Al Qaeda is not the same fighting force in Afghanistan that it was when the United States invaded in For years, it has been very weak inside Afghanistan and in neighboring regions. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has carried out few attacks, and Ansar Ghazwat ul Hind, the al Qaeda-aligned group in Kashmir, has proven ineffectual so far. Conditions, including the decline of ISIS, seem more and more conducive for an al Qaeda resurgence throughout the region.

For two decades since , the Taliban has offered safe haven to al Qaeda. The Taliban pledged that it would do no such thing, but al Qaeda members were continuously found in Afghanistan. As recently as October , when negotiations on the timetable for withdrawal were under way, Afghan government forces announced the killing of al Qaeda media chief Abu Muhsin al Masri also known as Hussam Abdul Raouf in Ghazni province.

Raouf was no small-time al Qaeda operative; he was a prominent religious authority and propagandist for al Qaeda Central—and just one of many cases of dangerous individuals given refuge by the Taliban. There is universal recognition that al Qaeda can now reinvest in its longstanding safe haven. An alleged al Qaeda-linked figure in Afghanistan described the strong alliance between al Qaeda and the Taliban:. I bear witness that many of the local supporters feared for us more than they feared for themselves…the relationship between the Taliban and the immigrants, especially those who joined them after aligning with them, is a strong and solid relationship that cannot be described with words, let alone wrapped with positions.

One person commented in a pro-al Qaeda group chat:. Image Credit Public Domain. As for the political discourse, the Taliban announced the acceptance of the pledge of allegiance to al Qaeda, and all al Qaeda soldiers are to this day its soldiers, and the Taliban is proud of them and they publish the translation and biography of Sheikh Osama bin Laden in their magazine al Somood, then the ignorant person comes to them and says they are not al Qaeda!!!

Al Qaeda is among them, and they are from them. Only the rebellious, chasing after an American journalist and the latest types of gels, are the ones who repeat this lie to justify their crimes and their destruction of the Levant Jihad. The idea of hijrah to Afghanistan is very appealing at a time when al Qaeda operatives and leaders have been made virtually homeless after being stomped out of Syria.

The ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be understood quantitatively. They are connected in a much more fundamental way, so the distinctions between how many al Qaeda operatives may be in one Taliban stronghold often overlook how intertwined they are more broadly.

Many observers underestimate the powerful bonds between the Taliban and al Qaeda. Pledging allegiance is a heavy religious commitment that is rarely reversed. And the pledge is only one element of their organizational bonds. In adapting its methods to Yemeni culture, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has made some missteps. In , the group attempted to impose extremely strict Islamic rule over two areas it controlled in south Yemen.

Al-Qaeda instituted rigid punishments of the sort common in Afghanistan, such as cutting off the hands of a thief and banning the chewed stimulant plant called khat. These extreme rules got al-Qaeda run out of town by Sunni tribal militias. The next time al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula asserted its political power over parts of Yemen left ungoverned in the chaos of civil war, in , it did not rule directly over these territories.

Rather, it allowed a local council to govern according their own norms and customs. And it kept the khat market open. Al-Qaeda also paid for long-neglected public services like schools, water and electricity — effectively becoming the state. According to the International Crisis Group , a humanitarian organization, this softer stance helped garner the acceptance of the local population.

That, in turn, ensured al-Qaeda could keep using Yemen as a regional headquarters. A similar shift from global to local has occurred in al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia, Iraq and Syria.

But it is stronger and more resilient than it was under bin Laden. Christian Taylor is a doctoral student at George Mason University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Related: How the Sri Lanka attacks relate to broader terrorism patterns Bin Laden hoped the US would respond with a military invasion into Muslim majority territory, triggering a holy war that would put al-Qaeda at the forefront of the fight against these unholy invaders.