Al qaeda where is it based

In retaliation, the U. In October , Al Qaeda bombed the U. Cole, an American guided-missile destroyer at Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American servicemen. It committed its most devastating attack on September 11, , when 19 Al Qaeda operatives hijacked four passenger planes and drove two into the Twin Towers in New York City and one into the Pentagon; a fourth plane crashed in rural Pennsylvania.

Nearly 3, people were killed in the attack. According to this theology, the ideal man is the Muslim holy warrior who is prepared to be martyred for the sake of God and the Jews represent his opposite. The battles currently being fought by Islamic terrorist groups may directly target the U. In the years since, Al Qaeda has also attempted to establish a foothold within Israel and the Palestinian territories; though so far with little success.

Indeed, several of the terrorists involved in the September 11th attacks were to a great extent motivated by their hatred toward Jews. Mohamed Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh, a key member of the Hamburg cell responsible for the attacks, considered New York City as the center for a global Jewish conspiracy, and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who masterminded the attack, had previously developed several plans to attack Israeli and Jewish targets.

In their view, New York, as a center of world finance, was the quintessential Jewish target. Al Qaeda has been involved in a number of attacks on Jewish targets, including: an attack on a Jewish synagogue in Tunisia on April ; the coordinated bombing of an Israeli-owned resort and an attempt to down an Israeli airliner in Mombassa, Kenya on November ; an attack on several Jewish-associated targets in Casablanca, Morocco on April ; the bombing of two Jewish Synagogues in Istanbul on November ; and an attack on several tourist resorts in Sinai, Egypt that are popular with Israelis on October Several additional plots around the world have failed.

Al Qaeda was, like many in the Middle East, committed in principal to the liberation of all Muslim lands and holy places, among these the Palestinian areas and the Al Aksa mosque in Jerusalem, but it was busier attacking its primary target- America and did not direct any recourses toward attacking Israel or Jews.

There are several explanations to what brought Al Qaeda and its affiliates to change their strategy to include Israel and the Jewish people among their strategic targets. First, the terror campaign against Jews seems to have been initiated and timed by the leadership, as evident from declarations made by Al Qaeda leaders and spokesmen. At first, post-September 11th declarations in support of the Palestinians may have been motivated by need for popularity.

But in it became apparent that Al Qaeda had made an ideological and strategic shift, making its enmity toward Jews more central. Any country that steps into the same trench as the Jews has only herself to blame. Following the American invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has relied more on locally-based organizations. Attacking Jews also has an added propaganda value to Al Qaeda, which relies on the fact that anti-Semitic feelings are widespread in Muslim countries.

In effect, this has allowed Al Qaeda to increase its influence by helping to fund, train and direct smaller, more regionally-focused terrorist groups. Following the toppling of the Taliban in by the U. Whereas Al Qaeda had previously planned and executed select missions with its own operatives, the destruction of its military headquarters and training camps by the U.

Al Qaeda has thus been able to continue its war against targeted governments by proxy, helping to plan attacks actually carried out by operatives from regional groups. It is worth noting that there is an ongoing debate as to the amount of influence Al Qaeda has on its regional allies. Recent investigations by various governments into terrorist individuals and attacks, however, have indicated that the organizations listed below are linked to Al Qaeda.

It should also be noted that the groups listed below are the largest and most important Al Qaeda allies, but do not constitute a complete list. Founded in , the group operates primarily out of Indonesia and seeks to overthrow regional governments and replace them with a totalitarian Islamic state. Its ideology and anti-Western rhetoric closely resembles that of Al Qaeda, making the two organizations natural allies.

The men reached an arrangement to coordinate attacks whereby JI would scout potential targets and provide supplies. In turn, Al Qaeda would provide funding, expertise and a number of willing suicide bombers. Fortunately, many of these attacks never came to fruition and Hambali was arrested in Thailand in In addition to its assistance in planning attacks in Southeast Asia, Al Qaeda provided guerrilla training to JI operatives at its camps in Afghanistan.

Between and November , many JI members were trained there, including its senior explosive expert, Dr. Azahari Husin. Despite the incarceration of several top leaders, JI continues to pose a threat to the stability of security of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia.

Indonesian authorities believe that the organization is behind an October suicide bombing in Bali which killed at least Though the extent of coordination between Al Qaeda and JI in this attack is unknown, authorities believe that several of the planners, including Azahari Husin, were trained by Al Qaeda. The Abu Sayyaf Group is a small militant Islamic organization operating out of the southern Philippines, where it seeks to establish an Islamic state.

Founded around , it is known for its brazen kidnappings and brutal beheadings. It has also conducted a number of large attacks on Filipino and foreign civilians, including a February bombing of a ferry in Manila harbor which killed people. Additionally, intelligence officials believe that Abu Sayyaf members have trained in Al Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Despite their past cooperation, the current operational links between Al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf are unclear.

According to police reports stemming from recent arrests in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf also trains and coordinates attacks with the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah. Hattab declared that the new group would refrain from attacking civilians. Largely due to this policy, the GSPC quickly rose to prominence in Algeria's rural areas, where most of its support is located.

It repeatedly attacks the Algerian military and also kidnaps Western tourists in an effort to weaken and ultimately overthrow the Algerian government, replacing it with Islamic rule based on a "pure" interpretation of the Koran.

The group is now closely allied with Al Qaeda, from which it receives material and financial support. Members of the organization have stated that that bin Laden himself ordered the creation of the group and continues to bankroll it.

In the past, the group has targeted France, and in September it issued a statement threatening the country with more attacks. Around the same time, a GSPC operative in Algerian custody divulged information about a cell in France which was allegedly planning to carry out major terrorist attacks on the Paris subway, Orly airport and the headquarters of the French intelligence service.

Members of the organization have been arrested in major raids in Italy, France and Spain. It espouses the same rigid Salafist ideology as Al Qaeda.

Intelligence services hold the group accountable for several major terrorist attacks, including the Madrid train bombings that killed over people and injured at least 1, European and U. Al Qaeda in Iraq was formed shortly after the U. In September , Zawahiri planned his last major international terror plot: to hijack the Pakistani Navy frigate Zulfiqar and use it to sink a U.

The plot was foiled only at the last moment. Zawahiri remains alive and he continues to issue statements from his hideout in Pakistan, but the core is defeated.

The heir of the al-Qaida organization in Iraq—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—has lost control of most of the ground it once held in Iraq and Syria but remains a very dangerous terrorist threat, with offshoots in Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The Islamic State also has cells in Western Europe. The ideology of bin Laden and Zawahiri played very little role in the Arab Spring in or the revolutions in Algeria and Sudan this year. It was criticized as too cautious by the Islamic State; ironically, time has shown that al-Qaida was right not to announce a caliphate or try to control territory.

Both al-Qaida and the Islamic State continue to inspire so-called lone wolf attacks by individuals who have no physical connections to either group. The central jihadi message that Islam is under attack by the West remains a potent one, reinforced by Islamophobia and bans on Muslims. The speed with which ISIS spread underscores how vulnerable the police states of the Middle East are when they become crippled by civil war.

The Saudi-Iranian proxy war feeds sectarian tensions and creates failed states in places like Yemen, where al-Qaida can stage a comeback.

The success of the war against al-Qaida has made possible the policy discussion about bringing our troops home from Afghanistan. In August , U. This became known as the "Awakening" As Sahawa. Rishawi's brother Shaykh Ahmad al-Rishawi later took over the group and, along with the governor Mamoun Rashid al-Awani and other tribal figures from Anbar, visited Washington D.

Marines in Anbar Province. This additional force apparently emboldened the Anbar Salvation Council to continue recruiting Sunni volunteers to secure the province and purportedly convinced Anbar residents to increase their cooperation with U.

To retain the loyalty of the Sons of Iraq, U. However, the Shiite-dominated Maliki government fears that the Sunni fighters are trying to burrow into the ISF with the intent of regaining power in Iraq, and have only agreed to accept about 35, Sons of Iraq fighters onto the ISF payrolls, not all of which are Sunni.

Some Sons of Iraq have already abandoned their positions out of frustration, particularly in Diyala Province, although they have not necessarily resumed insurgent activity. By June , at the height of the U. He and other commanders reported an ability to walk incident free, although with security, in downtown Ramadi, a city that had been a major battleground only months earlier and which U.

General Petraeus testified in April that he estimates that Anbar Province could be turned over to Provincial Iraqi Control by July , although the handover has been delayed by a power struggle between the Awakening tribal figures and the more urban, established Iraqi Sunni parties such as the Iraqi Islamic Party IIP. In May , a Diyala Salvation Council was formed in Diyala Province of tribal leaders who wanted to stabilize that restive province.

In early , Amiriyah was highly violent, but was stabilized by the emergence of former Sunni insurgents now cooperating with U. In Baghdad, the U. Prime Minister Maliki said on February 16, that AQ-I had been largely driven out of Baghdad, and assessment that has not been subsequently contradicted by U.

Petraeus attempted to increase the momentum of the Awakening Movement and the Sons of Iraq program with extensive U. The large scale operations included those related to the troop surge in Baghdad, and two other large operations—Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike. Operation Phantom Thunder June , was intended to clear AQ-I sanctuaries in the "belts" of towns and villages within a 30 mile radius around Baghdad. Part of the operation reportedly involved surrounded Baquba, the capital city of Diyala Province, to prevent the escape of AQ-I from the U.

General Petraeus appeared before four Committees of Congress during April , to discuss progress in Iraq. On August 10, , Gen. James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, told journalists that AQ-I had permanently lost its foothold in large parts of Iraq, that it is no longer welcomed by Sunni populations in Iraq, and theat AQ-I fighters had begun to shift their focus to Afghanistan where their efforts against the United States might be more effective.

On the other hand, General Petraeus testified and has said in other settings that AQ-I remains highly active in and around Mosul, and views Mosul as key to its survival in Iraq, because it is astride the entry routes from Syria. He testified that AQ-I is "still capable of lethal attacks" and that the United States must "maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource flows that sustain it.

While Al Qaeda leaders likely see the declining effectiveness of AQ-I as a vulnerability to their global recruiting and fundraising efforts, they likely continue to see the fight in Iraq as important to their battle with the United States. Although there have been differences among commanders about the contribution of the foreign fighters to the overall violence in Iraq, estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters have remained fairly consistent over time, at least as a percentage of the overall insurgency.

As early as October , U. Abizaid said on January 29, , that the number of foreign fighters in Iraq was "low" and "in the hundreds. The State Department report on terrorism for Country Reports on Terrorism: , released April 30, says AQ-I has a "membership" estimated at 5, - 10,, making it the largest Sunni extremist group in Iraq.

This estimate is somewhat higher than what many experts might expect in light of the official U. Another issue is the rate of flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. Another issue is the specific nationalities of the foreigners. One press report in July , quoting U.

That article was consistent with the findings of a study produced by the Combating Terrorism Center of West Point Al Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq , based on records of foreign nationals who had entered Iraq, and whose papers were found in Iraq by U. If the reports of significant AQ-I relocations to the Pakistan tribal areas bordering Afghanistan are correct, this would suggest that the links are tightening between AQ-I and Al Qaeda's central leadership as represented by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Both Al Qaeda leaders are widely believed to be hiding in areas of Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan, and many assessments since say that Al Qaeda is enjoying increasing freedom of movement and action in the border regions. Policy , by [author name scrubbed].

On the other hand, as noted above, the fact that AQ-I fighters and leaders are leaving Iraq represents a blow to Al Qaeda and could weaken its ability to recruit new adherents. As discussed above, on July 24, , President Bush devoted much of a speech to the argument that AQ-I is closely related to Al Qaeda's central leadership.

The President noted the following details, including:. Some experts believe that links between Al Qaeda's central leadership and AQ-I have been tenuous, and that the few operatives linking the two do not demonstrate an ongoing, substantial relationship.

Others point to the Zawahiri admonishment of Zarqawi, discussed above, as evidence that there is not a close connection between the two. Still others have maintained that there is little evidence that AQ-I seeks to attack broadly outside Iraq, and that those incidents that have taken place have been in Jordan, where Zarqawi might have wanted to try to undermine King Abdullah II, whom Zarqawi opposed as too close to the United States.

Since the attacks noted above, there have not been any attacks outside Iraq that can be directly attributed to AQ-I. The first such head was Dr. David Kay. Department of State, Washington File. March 17, Priest, Dana and Glenn Kessler. January 8, Milbank, Dana.

Goldberg, Jeffrey. Pincus, Walter. September 12, Chivers, C. Cheney's Long Path to War. Newsweek , November 17, Risen, James. Gertz, Bill. State of the Union Message by President Bush. January 20, Text contained in New York Times , January 21, Miller, Greg. Los Angeles Times , September 9, Brinkley, Joel. New York Times , November 19, Agence France Presse, February 4, Gordon, Michael. For a detailed description of U. The quotes in this paragraph are from the testimony of Gen.

April , Bonner, Raymond and Joel Brinkley. New York Times , October 28, Shanker, Thom. Commanders Surveys Challenges in Iraq Region. New York Times , January 30, Parker, Ned. Oppel, Richard. Topic Areas About Donate.

Download PDF. Download EPUB. Summary In explaining the decision to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein from power, the Administration asserted, among other justifications, that the regime of Saddam Hussein had a working relationship with the Al Qaeda organization.

According to the presentation: 6 Iraq and terrorism go back decades Links in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan The "DOD memorandum," as well as other accounts, 12 include assertions that Iraqi intelligence developed a relationship with Al Qaeda in the early s, brokered by the Islamist leaders of Sudan.

In a July 24, , speech specifically on the issue, 30 President Bush said Estimated Numbers of Foreign Fighters Although there have been differences among commanders about the contribution of the foreign fighters to the overall violence in Iraq, estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters have remained fairly consistent over time, at least as a percentage of the overall insurgency.

The President noted the following details, including: In , Zarqawi formally joined Al Qaeda and pledged allegiance to bin Laden. He asserted later in the speech that, according to U. In July , Brig.