Who said computer says no

Conjectures are of great importance since they suggest useful lines of research. Thinking is a function of man's immortal soul. God has given an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think. I am unable to accept any part of this, but will attempt to reply in theological terms. I should find the argument more convincing if animals were classed with men, for there is a greater difference, to my mind, between the typical animate and the inanimate than there is between man and the other animals.

The arbitrary character of the orthodox view becomes clearer if we consider how it might appear to a member of some other religious community. How do Christians regard the Moslem view that women have no souls? But let us leave this point aside and return to the main argument.

It appears to me that the argument quoted above implies a serious restriction of the omnipotence of the Almighty. It is admitted that there are certain things that He cannot do such as making one equal to two, but should we not believe that He has freedom to confer a soul on an elephant if He sees fit? We might expect that He would only exercise this power in conjunction with a mutation which provided the elephant with an appropriately improved brain to minister to the needs of this soul.

An argument of exactly similar form may be made for the case of machines. But this really only means that we think it would be less likely that He would consider the circumstances suitable for conferring a soul. The circumstances in question are discussed in the rest of this paper. In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates.

However, this is mere speculation. I am not very impressed with theological arguments whatever they may be used to support. Such arguments have often been found unsatisfactory in the past. With our present knowledge such an argument appears futile.

When that knowledge was not available it made a quite different impression. Let us hope and believe that they cannot do so. This argument is seldom expressed quite so openly as in the form above.

But it affects most of us who think about it at all. We like to believe that Man is in some subtle way superior to the rest of creation. It is best if he can be shown to be necessarily superior, for then there is no danger of him losing his commanding position.

The popularity of the theological argument is clearly connected with this feeling. It is likely to be quite strong in intellectual people, since they value the power of thinking more highly than others, and are more inclined to base their belief in the superiority of Man on this power. I do not think that this argument is sufficiently substantial to require refutation.

Consolation would be more appropriate: perhaps this should be sought in the transmigration of souls. There are a number of results of mathematical logic which can be used to show that there are limitations to the powers of discrete-state machines.

There are other, in some respects similar, results due to Church, Kleene, Rosser, and Turing. The result in question refers to a type of machine which is essentially a digital computer with an infinite capacity.

It states that there are certain things that such a machine cannot do. If it is rigged up to give answers to questions as in the imitation game, there will be some questions to which it will either give a wrong answer, or fail to give an answer at all however much time is allowed for a reply. There may, of course, be many such questions, and questions which cannot be answered by one machine may be satisfactorily answered by another.

When the machine described bears a certain comparatively simple relation to the machine which is under interrogation, it can be shown that the answer is either wrong or not forthcoming. This is the mathematical result: it is argued that it proves a disability of machines to which the human intellect is not subject.

The short answer to this argument is that although it is established that there are limitations to the powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated, without any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to the human intellect.

But I do not think this view can be dismissed quite so lightly. Whenever one of these machines is asked the appropriate critical question, and gives a definite answer, we know that this answer must be wrong, and this gives us a certain feeling of superiority. Is this feeling illusory? It is no doubt quite genuine, but I do not think too much importance should be attached to it. We too often give wrong answers to questions ourselves to be justified in being very pleased at such evidence of fallibility on the part of the machines.

Further, our superiority can only be felt on such an occasion in relation to the one machine over which we have scored our petty triumph. There would be no question of triumphing simultaneously over all machines. In short, then, there might be men cleverer than any given machine, but then again there might be other machines cleverer again, and so on. Those who hold to the mathematical argument would, I think, mostly be willing to accept the imitation game as a basis for discussion.

Those who believe in the two previous objections would probably not be interested in any criteria. This argument is very well expressed in Professor Jefferson's Lister Oration for , from which I quote. No mechanism could feel and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.

This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular man.

It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. Instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks. I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme and solipsist point of view.

Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test. Let us listen in to a part of such a viva voce :.

Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison. By a winter's flay one means a typical winter's day, rather than a special one like Christmas.

And so on. What would Professor Jefferson say if the sonnet-writing machine was able to answer like this in the viva voce? This phrase is, I think, intended to cover such devices as the inclusion in the machine of a record of someone reading a sonnet, with appropriate switching to turn it on from time to time.

In short then, I think that most of those who support the argument from consciousness could be persuaded to abandon it rather than be forced into the solipsist position. They will then probably be willing to accept our test. I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localise it.

But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this paper. Numerous features X are suggested in this connexion. I offer a selection:. Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly p. Some of these disabilities are given special consideration as indicated by the page numbers.

No support is usually offered for these statements. I believe they are mostly founded on the principle of scientific induction. A man has seen thousands of machines in his lifetime. From what he sees of them he draws a number of general conclusions. They are ugly, each is designed for a very limited purpose, when required for a minutely different purpose they are useless, the variety of behaviour of any one of them is very small, etc. Naturally he concludes that these are necessary properties of machines in general.

Many of these limitations are associated with the very small storage capacity of most machines. I am assuming that the idea of storage capacity is extended in some way to cover machines other than discrete-state machines. The exact definition does not matter as no mathematical accuracy is claimed in the present discussion. A few years ago, when very little had been heard of digital computers, it was possible to elicit much incredulity concerning them, if one mentioned their properties without describing their construction.

That was presumably due to a similar application of the principle of scientific induction. These applications of the principle are of course largely unconscious. When a burnt child fears the fire and shows that he fears it by avoiding it, I should say that he was applying scientific induction. I could of course also describe his behaviour in many other ways. The works and customs of mankind do not seem to be very suitable material to which to apply scientific induction.

A very large part of space-time must be investigated, if reliable results are to be obtained. Otherwise we may as most English children do decide that everybody speaks English, and that it is silly to learn French.

There are, however, special remarks to be made about many of the disabilities that have been mentioned. The inability to enjoy strawberries and cream may have struck the reader as frivolous.

Possibly a machine might be made to enjoy this delicious dish, but any attempt to make one do so would be idiotic.

What is important about this disability is that it contributes to some of the other disabilities, e. I think this criticism can be explained in terms of the imitation game.

It is claimed that the interrogator could distinguish the machine from the man simply by setting them a number of problems in arithmetic. The machine would be unmasked because of its deadly accuracy. The reply to this is simple. The machine programmed for playing the game would not attempt to give the right answers to the arithmetic problems. It would deliberately introduce mistakes in a manner calculated to confuse the interrogator.

A mechanical fault would probably show itself through an unsuitable decision as to what sort of a mistake to make in the arithmetic. Even this interpretation of the criticism is not sufficiently sympathetic. But we cannot afford the space to go into it much further. It seems to me that this criticism depends on a confusion between two kinds of mistake.

Errors of functioning are due to some mechanical or electrical fault which causes the machine to behave otherwise than it was designed to do. These abstract machines are mathematical fictions rather than physical objects. By definition they are incapable of errors of functioning. Errors of conclusion can only arise when some meaning is attached to the output signals from the machine.

The machine might, for instance, type out mathematical equations, or sentences in English. When a false proposition is typed we say that the machine has committed an error of conclusion. There is clearly no reason at all for saying that a machine cannot make this kind of mistake. To take a less perverse example, it might have some method for drawing conclusions by scientific induction. We must expect such a method to lead occasionally to erroneous results.

The claim that a machine cannot be the subject of its own thought can of course only be answered if it can be shown that the machine has some thought with some subject matter. In this sort of sense a machine undoubtedly can be its own subject matter. It may be used to help in making up its own programmes, or to predict the effect of alterations in its own structure.

By observing the results of its own behaviour it can modify its own programmes so as to achieve some purpose more effectively. These are possibilities of the near future, rather than Utopian dreams. The criticism that a machine cannot have much diversity of behaviour is just a way of saying that it cannot have much storage capacity. Until fairly recently a storage capacity of even a thousand digits was very rare. The criticisms that we are considering here are often disguised forms of the argument from consciousness.

Usually if one maintains that a machine can do one of these things, and describes the kind of method that the machine could use, one will not make much of an impression. It is thought that the method whatever it may be, for it must be mechanical is really rather base. Compare the parenthesis in Jefferson's statement quoted on p. This statement is quoted by Hartree p. Whether this is possible in principle or not is a stimulating and exciting question, suggested by some of these recent developments.

I am in thorough agreement with Hartree over this. It will be noticed that be does not assert that the machines in question had not got the property, but rather that the evidence available to Lady Lovelace did not encourage her to believe that they had it. It is quite possible that the machines in question had in a sense got this property.

For suppose that some discrete-state machine has the property. The Analytical Engine was a universal digital computer, so that, if its storage capacity and speed were adequate, it could by suitable programming be made to mimic the machine in question. Probably this argument did not occur to the Countess or to Babbage.

In any case there was no obligation on them to claim all that could be claimed. This whole question will be considered again under the heading of learning machines. This statement is a more direct challenge and can be met directly. Machines take me by surprise with great frequency. This is largely because I do not do sufficient calculation to decide what to expect them to do, or rather because, although I do a calculation, I do it in a hurried, slipshod fashion, taking risks. Naturally I am often wrong, and the result is a surprise for me for by the time the experiment is done these assumptions have been forgotten.

These admissions lay me open to lectures on the subject of my vicious ways, but do not throw any doubt on my credibility when I testify to the surprises I experience. I do not expect this reply to silence my critic. He will probably say that such surprises are due to some creative mental act on my part, and reflect no credit on the machine. This leads us back to the argument from consciousness, and far from the idea of surprise.

The view that machines cannot give rise to surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy to which philosophers and mathematicians are particularly subject. This is the assumption that as soon as a fact is presented to a mind all consequences of that fact spring into the mind simultaneously with it.

It is a very useful assumption under many circumstances, but one too easily forgets that it is false. A natural consequence of doing so is that one then assumes that there is no virtue in the mere working out of consequences from data and general principles. The nervous system is certainly not a discrete-state machine.

A small error in the information about the size of a nervous impulse impinging on a neuron, may make a large difference to the size of the outgoing impulse. It may be argued that, this being so, one cannot expect to be able to mimic the behaviour of the nervous system with a discrete-state system.

It is true that a discrete-state machine must be different from a continuous machine. But if we adhere to the conditions of the imitation game, the interrogator will not be able to take any advantage of this difference. The situation can be made clearer if we consider some other simpler continuous machine. A differential analyser will do very well. A differential analyser is a certain kind of machine not of the discrete-state type used for some kinds of calculation.

Some of these provide their answers in a typed form, and so are suitable for taking part in the game. It would not be possible for a digital computer to predict exactly what answers the differential analyser would give to a problem, but it would be quite capable of giving the right sort of answer. Under these circumstances it would be very difficult for the interrogator to distinguish the differential analyser from the digital computer. It is not possible to produce a set of rules purporting to describe what a man should do in every conceivable set of circumstances.

One might for instance have a rule that one is to stop when one sees a red traffic light, and to go if one sees a green one, but what if by some fault both appear together? One may perhaps decide that it is safest to stop. But some further difficulty may well arise from this decision later. To attempt to provide rules of conduct to cover every eventuality, even those arising from traffic lights, appears to be impossible.

With all this I agree. From this it is argued that we cannot be machines. I shall try to reproduce the argument, but I fear I shall hardly do it justice. It seems to run something like this.

But there are no such rules, so men cannot be machines. I do not think the argument is ever put quite like this, bat I believe this is the argument used nevertheless.

For we believe that it is not only true that being regulated by laws of behaviour implies being some sort of machine though not necessarily a discrete-state machine , but that conversely being such a machine implies being regulated by such laws. However, we cannot so easily convince ourselves of the absence of complete laws of behaviour as of complete rules of conduct.

There are no such laws. We can demonstrate more forcibly that any such statement would be unjustified. For suppose we could be sure of finding such laws if they existed. Then given a discrete-state machine it should certainly be possible to discover by observation sufficent about it to predict its future behaviour, and this within a reasonable time, say a thousand years. But this does not seem to be the case. I have set up on the Manchester computer a small programme using only units of storage, whereby the machine supplied with one sixteen figure number replies with another within two seconds.

I would defy anyone to learn from these replies sufficient about the programme to be able to predict any replies to untried values. I assume that the reader is familiar with the idea of extra-sensory perception, and the meaning of the four items of it, viz. These disturbing phenomena seem to deny all our usual scientific ideas. How we should like to discredit them!

Unfortunately the statistical evidence, at least for telepathy, is overwhelming. It is very difficult to rearrange one's ideas so as to fit these new facts in. Once one has accepted them it does not seem a very big step to believe in ghosts and bogies. The idea that our bodies move simply according to the known laws of physics, together with some others not yet discovered but somewhat similar, would be one of the first to go. This argument is to my mind quite a strong one. One can say in reply that many scientific theories seem to remain workable in practice, in spite of clashing with E.

This is rather cold comfort, and one fears that thinking is just the kind of phenomenon where E. A more specific argument based on E. The machine can only guess at random, and perhaps gets right, so the interrogator makes the right identification. Suppose the digital computer contains a random number generator. Then it will be natural to use this to decide what answer to give.

But then the random number generator will be subject to the psycho-kinetic powers of the interrogator. Perhaps this psycho-kinesis might cause the machine to guess right more often than would be expected on a probability calculation, so that the interrogator might still be unable to make the right identification.

On the other hand, he might be able to guess right without any questioning, by clairvoyance. With E. If telepathy is admitted it will be necessary to tighten our test up. The situation could be regarded as analogous to that which would occur if the interrogator were talking to himself and one of the competitors was listening with his ear to the wall. The reader will have anticipated that I have no very convincing arguments of a positive nature to support my views.

If I had I should not have taken such pains to point out the fallacies in contrary views. Such evidence as I have I shall now give. Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace's objection, which stated that the machine can only do what we tell it to do. Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away.

If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed.

Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds, and is there one for machines? There does seem to be one for the human mind.

An idea presented to such a mind will on average give rise to less than one idea in reply. A smallish proportion are super-critical. Animals minds seem to be very definitely sub-critical. In considering the functions of the mind or the brain we find certain operations which we can explain in purely mechanical terms.

This we say does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin which we must strip off if we are to find the real mind. But then in what remains we find a further skin to be stripped off, and so on.

In the latter case the whole mind is mechanical. It would not be a discrete-state machine however. We have discussed this. These last two paragraphs do not claim to be convincing arguments.

But what can we say in the meantime? What steps should be taken now if the experiment is to be successful? As I have explained, the problem is mainly one of programming. Advances in engineering will have to be made too, but it seems unlikely that these will not be adequate for the requirements.

Estimates of the storage capacity of the brain vary from 10 10 to 10 15 binary digits. I incline to the lower values and believe that only a very small fraction is used for the higher types of thinking.

Most of it is probably used for the retention of visual impressions. I should be surprised if more than 10 9 was required for satisfactory playing of the imitation game, at any rate against a blind man. A storage capacity of 10 7 would be a very practicable possibility even by present techniques.

It is probably not necessary to increase the speed of operations of the machines at all. Parts of modem machines which can be regarded as analogues of nerve cells work about a thousand times faster than the latter.

Our problem then is to find out how to programme these machines to play the game. At my present rate of working I produce about a thousand digits of programme a day, so that about sixty workers, working steadily through the fifty years might accomplish the job, if nothing went into the waste-paper basket. Some more expeditious method seems desirable. In the process of trying to imitate an adult human mind we are bound to think a good deal about the process which has brought it to the state that it is in.

We may notice three components,. Other experience, not to be described as education, to which it has been subjected. Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate the adult mind, why not rather try to produce one which simulates the child's?

If this were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would obtain the adult brain. Presumably the child-brain is something like a note-book as one buys it from the stationers. Rather little mechanism, and lots of blank sheets. Mechanism and writing are from our point of view almost synonymous.

Our hope is that there is so little mechanism in the child-brain that something like it can be easily programmed. The amount of work in the education we can assume, as a first approximation, to be much the same as for the human child. We have thus divided our problem into two parts. The child-programme and the education process. These two remain very closely connected. We cannot expect to find a good child-machine at the first attempt. One must experiment with teaching one such machine and see how well it learns.

One can then try another and see if it is better or worse. There is an obvious connection between this process and evolution, by the identifications. One may hope, however, that this process will be more expeditious than evolution. The survival of the fittest is a slow method for measuring advantages. The experimenter, by the exercise of intelligence, should be able to speed it up.

Equally important is the fact that he is not restricted to random mutations. If he can trace a cause for some weakness he can probably think of the kind of mutation which will improve it. It will not be possible to apply exactly the same teaching process to the machine as to a normal child.

It will not, for instance, be provided with legs, so that it could not be asked to go out and fill the coal scuttle.

Possibly it might not have eyes. But however well these deficiencies might be overcome by clever engineering, one could not send the creature to school without the other children making excessive fun of it.

It must be given some tuition. We need not be too concerned about the legs, eyes, etc. The example of Miss Helen Keller shows that education can take place provided that communication in both directions between teacher and pupil can take place by some means or other. Clinicians who used the tests explained how the results supported communication with patients, in the context of antibiotic stewardship.

We heard accounts about how the guidance about what to do in the CRP middle range supported the greater use of delayed prescriptions. Challenges to using CRP testing included the difficulty of maintaining training and awareness amongst a varied and variable staff team, who work irregular shifts across different bases, the pressures of time and workload in OOH settings, and concerns about leaving patients in clinical rooms to use a central machine. Having an HCA to do the test, or desktop POC equipment in each room were identified as changes that could mitigate against this.

Uncertainty about the value and potential risks of CRP testing in a holistic clinical assessment limited uptake for some clinicians we spoke to. Training, resource and time-pressure issues reduced usage for some, which could be potentially mitigated against, including HCA support to do the test, desk-top equipment, and strategies for on-going training.

This could be a powerful motivator for supporting uptake. Skip to main content Skip to main navigation. Talk Code:. Author institutions:. CRP may be a useful tool to guide prescribing decisions in a clinical context where doctors are dealing with uncertainty, are unfamiliar with the patients and under pressure to see patients quickly Approach This paper reports on the qualitative component of an on-going mixed-methods evaluation of a study in which point of care CRP testing was made available to clinicians working in Care UK OOH bases.