How do supernatural and natural virtues differ

They do not give the power to act for the faculty has that already , but they give facility in operation. The supernatural or infused virtues give the power to act supernaturally without them it would be impossible, apart from an actual grace , but they do not give facility in operation.

By reason of the efficient cause. The natural virtues are acquired by our own proper acts; the supernatural virtues are infused by God together with sanctifying grace. By reason of the final cause. The acquired, natural virtues enable us to conduct ourselves rightly in regard to human acts in accordance with our rational nature. The supernatural virtues, on the other hand, give us the ability to conduct ourselves rightly in regard to our condition as adopted children of God, destined for eternal life, and to exercise the supernatural acts.

The natural virtues work for the good according to the dictate and light of natural reason; the supernatural virtues work for the good according to the dictate and supernatural light of faith. There are four properties that the infused virtues have in common with the acquired natural virtues: 1 they consist in the mean or medium between the two extremes except for the theological virtues, and even these do so by reason of the subject and mode ; 2 in the state of perfection they are united among themselves by prudence and the infused virtues by charity also ; 3 they are unequal in perfection or eminence; and 4 those that imply no imperfection perdure after this life as to their formal elements.

The characteristics or properties that are exclusive to the infused virtues are the following: 1. They always accompany sanctifying grace and are infused together with grace. This doctrine is common among the theologians, although it is not exactly defined by the Church. They are really distinct from sanctifying grace. It suffices to recall that grace is an entitative habit infused into the essence of the soul, while the infused virtues are operative habits infused into the potencies, which are really distinct from the soul.

They are specifically distinct from the corresponding acquired natural virtues. This has been previously demonstrated. They are supernatural in their essence but not in their mode of operation. They increase with sanctifying grace. Paul writes to the Ephesians: "Rather let us profess the truth in love and grow to the full maturity of Christ the head" Eph. To the Philippians he says: "My prayer is that your love may more and more abound, both in understanding and wealth of experience" Phil.

And he prays for the Romans "that through the power of the Holy Spirit you may have hope in abundance" Rom. They give us the intrinsic power for supernatural acts but not the extrinsic facility for those acts. This explains why the repentant habitual sinner experiences great difficulty in the practice of virtue.

The difficulty can be overcome by perfecting the acquired virtues. The acquired virtues cannot assist the infused virtues intrinsically, of course, because a natural, acquired habit cannot perfect a supernatural, infused virtue.

However, it can help extrinsically by removing obstacles or by correcting disordered concupiscence. When the obstacles are removed, the infused virtues can begin to work promptly and delightfully. Except for faith and hope, they are all lost as a result of mortal sin.

The reason is that the infused virtues are like properties flowing from sanctifying grace, and when grace is destroyed they also are destroyed. Only faith and hope can remain, and they in an unformed and imperfect state. They cannot diminish directly.

This diminution could be caused only by venial sin or by the cessation of the acts of virtue. But they cannot be diminished by venial sin because this sin leaves intact the orientation to the supernatural end proper to the infused virtues. Nor can they be diminished by the cessation of the acts of the virtues, for these virtues were not acquired by human effort and hence do not depend on repeated acts. Nevertheless, the infused virtues may be diminished indirectly by venial sins so far as these sins stifle the fervor of charity, impede progress in virtue, and predispose to mortal sin.

Division of the Infused Virtues Some of the infused virtues ordain the faculties to the end or goal; others dispose them in regard to the means. The first group is the theological virtues; the second group is the moral virtues.

The first corresponds, in the order of grace, with the principles of the natural order that direct us to our natural end; the second corresponds with the acquired virtues of the natural order that perfect us in regard to the means. Once again the close similarity and analogy between the natural and the supernatural orders are evident. Theological Virtues. The existence of the theological virtues seems to be clearly indicated in several texts of St. Paul, including: "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" Rom.

Moreover, the Church has stated in equivalent formulas that we receive with sanctifying grace the gifts of faith, hope, charity, and the other virtues. Since grace is not immediately operative, it requires operative principles to grow and develop to perfection. Among these principles, some must refer to the supernatural end theological virtues , and others must refer to the means that lead to that end moral virtues. This argument takes its force principally from the divine economy and the workings of divine providence, made known to us through relevation.

The theological virtues are operative principles by which we are ordained directly and immediately to God as our supernatural end. They have God himself as their material object and one of his divine attributes as their formal object. Since they are strictly supernatural, only God can infuse them into the soul. There are three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. The reason for this number is that, by these three, immediate union with God is realized perfectly.

Faith enables us to know God as First Truth; hope makes us desire him as the Supreme Good for us; charity unites us to him by the love of friendship, so far as he is infinite Goodness. There are no other aspects of union with God, for although the divine perfections are infinite, they cannot be attained by human acts except under the aspect of truth by the intellect and goodness by the will.

And only this latter admits of a twofold aspect, namely, good for us hope and goodness in itself charity. That the theological virtues are distinct among themselves is something beyond doubt, since they can actually be separated.

Faith can subsist without hope and charity as in one who commits a mortal t,sin of despair without losing his faith ; charity will perdure eternally in heaven, separate from faith and hope, which will have disappeared cf. In these instances faith and hope remain in the soul in an unformed state, since charity is the form of the virtues. In the order of generation or of origin, the first is to know faith , then to desire hope , and lastly to attain charity.

According to the order of perfection, charity is the most excellent of the theological virtues "and the greatest of these is love" -- 1 Cor. As to the other two virtues, faith is superior to hope because it bespeaks a relation with God in himself, whereas hope presents God as a good for us.

Moreover, faith is the foundation of hope. On the other hand, hope is more closely related to charity, and in this sense it is more perfect than faith. Moral Virtues. The existence of the infused moral virtues was denied by numerous ancient theologians, but today it is admitted by almost all theologians, in accordance with the doctrine of St.

Gregory the Great, and St. The basis of this doctrine is to be found in Scripture. Thus, in the Book of Wisdom we are told that nothing is more useful in the life of a person than temperance, prudence, fortitude, and justice: "If one loves justice, the fruits of her works are virtues; for she teaches moderation and prudence, justice and fortitude, and nothing in life is more useful for men than these" Wis.

Peter, immediately after speaking of grace as a participation in the divine nature of God, states: "For this very reason make every effort to supplement your faith with virtue, and virtue with knowledge, and knowledge with self-control, and self-control with steadfastness, and steadfastness with godliness, and godliness with brotherly affection, and brotherly affection with love" 2 Pet.

In these and other texts we have the scriptural basis that was later elaborated by the Fathers and theologians to give us a body of doctrine that is perfectly organized and systematic. It is true that the Church has not expressly defined anything on this question, but today the doctrine on the existence of the infused moral virtues is generally accepted. The theological virtues are demanded by the very nature of grace so that it can be dynamically orientated to the supernatural end; the moral virtues are demanded by the theological virtues because to be ordained to the end requires a proper disposition to the means.

Hence, the infused moral virtues are habits that dispose the faculties of man to follow the dictate of reason illumined by faith in relation to the means that lead to the supernatural end. They do not have God as their immediate object -- and in this they are distinguished from the theological virtues -- but they rightly ordain human acts to the supernatural end, and in this way they are distinguished from the corresponding acquired natural virtues.

The infused moral virtues regulate all the acts of man, including at least on the part of prudence the very acts of the theological virtues, in spite of the fact that these latter virtues are superior to the moral virtues. For although the theological virtues, considered in themselves, do not consist in the mean. So it is that the moral virtues must be numerous, as St.

Thomas points out: "For every act in which there is found a special aspect of goodness, man must be disposed by a special virtue. Thomas studies and discusses more than fifty moral virtues in the Summa theologiae, and perhaps it was not his intention to give a complete and exhaustive treatment. However, since ancient times it has been the custom to reduce the moral virtues to four principal ones, namely, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

They are expressly named in Sacred Scripture, as we have already seen, and they are called the virtues most profitable for man in this life. Among the Fathers of the Church, St. Ambrose is apparently the first to call them cardinal virtues. Thomas maintains that these virtues can be called cardinal from two points of view: in a less proper sense, because they designate general conditions or characteristics necessary for any virtue every virtue calls for prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation ; more properly, because they pertain to special activities that require the control of virtue.

Hence, the cardinal virtues are special virtues, not merely general virtues that comprise all the other virtues. The principality of the cardinal virtues can be seen in the influence they exercise over their subordinated virtues. The latter virtues function in secondary related matters, leaving the principal matter to the corresponding cardinal virtue.

Hence, each of the cardinal virtues can be divided into integral parts, subjective parts, and potential parts. The integral parts refer to conditions or characteristics necessary for the perfect exercise of the virtue. Thus, patience and constancy are integral parts of fortitude. The subjective parts are the various species of the principal virtue. Thus, sobriety and chastity are subjective parts of temperance. The potential parts are those annexed virtues that do not have the full force and power of the principal virtue but are in some way related to it.

Thus, the virtue of religion is annexed to justice because it has to do with rendering to God the cult that is due, although this can never be done perfectly, because one cannot achieve the equality required for strict justice.

But does the principality of the cardinal virtues make them superior to the secondary related virtues? Evidently not, for religion and penance are superior to justice, since their object is nobler. Humility is related to temperance, but is more excellent than temperance. Nevertheless, it is necessary to preserve the principality of the cardinal virtues as hinges of the others, because they comply more fully with their definitions as virtues. For example, commutative justice has more of the aspect of justice than religion or penance.

An annexed or related virtue may be superior, by reason of its object, but the cardinal virtue is superior precisely as a cardinal virtue. We shall treat of particular virtues when we discuss the positive means for growth in grace and holiness Chapter 9. Now, however, we shall investigate the last and crowning element of the supernatural organism, namely, the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

The Gifts of the Holy Spirit. In general usage, a gift signifies anything that one person gives to another out of liberality and with benevolence. We say "out of liberality" to signify that on the part of the giver a gift excludes any notion of debt or obligation.

And we say "with benevolence" to signify the love that prompts the gift. Nevertheless, the notion of a gift does not exclude gratitude on the part of the one receiving the gift; even more, it sometimes demands the good use of the gift, depending on the nature of the gift and the intention of the giver, as when one gives something in order that the receiver be perfected by its use.

Such are the gifts that God bestows on his creatures. The first great gift of God is the Holy Spirit, who is the very love by which God loves himself and loves us: The Holy Spirit is, therefore, the first gift of God, not only because he is the substantial love in the intimate life of the Trinity, but also because he dwells in us through sanctifying grace.

From this first gift proceed all other gifts of God. In the last analysis, whatever God gives to his creatures, both in the supernatural and in the natural order, is a completely gratuitous effect of his liberal and infinite love. Existence of the Gifts The existence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit can be known to us only through revelation, since they are supernatural realities that completely transcend the light of natural reason. Thomas begins with this supposition in the treatise on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Summa theologiae , and says that in the doctrine on the gifts we should follow the mode of speaking as found in Sacred Scripture, where they are revealed to us.

And the Spiiit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord. Arid his delight shall be in the fear of the Lord" Isa. This text is clearly messianic and properly refers only to the Messiah. Nevertheless, the Fathers of the Church and the Church herself have extended the meaning to the faithful of Christ in virtue of the universal principle of the economy of grace that St.

Paul enunciated: "For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren" Rom. From this it is inferred that whatever perfection is found in Christ, our Head, if it is communicable, is found also in the members united to him through grace.

And it is evident that the gifts of the Holy Spirit pertain to communicable perfections, if we bear in mind the need we have of them. Hence, we may rightly conclude that the seven spirits that the prophet saw descend and rest upon Christ are also the patrimony of all those who are united to him in charity. In addition to this text, which the Fathers and the Church have interpreted as a clear allusion to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, authors are wont to cite other texts from the Old and New Testaments.

The teaching of the Church is explicit in the liturgy. In the Divine Office for Pentecost Sunday the hymn at evening prayer addresses the Holy Spirit as follows: "Thou who art sevenfold in thy grace"; and in the prayer for the feast the Church asks God to "pour out the gifts of the Spirit on all mankind. Send your Holy Spirit upon them to be their helper and guide. Give them the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of right judgment and courage, the spirit of knowledge and reverence.

Fill them with the spirit of wonder and awe in your presence. We ask this through Christ our Lord. By means of these gifts the soul is furnished and strengthened so as to be able to obey more easily and promptly his voice and impulse. Wherefore, these gifts are of such efficacy that they lead the just man to the highest degree of sanctity; and of such excellence that they continue to exist even in heaven, though in a more perfect way. By means of these gifts the soul is excited and encouraged to seek after and attain the evangelical beatitudes which, like the flowers that come forth in the springtime, are signs and harbingers of eternal beatitude.

The number of the gifts presents two principal difficulties: 1 in Sacred Scripture the number seven is classically interpreted to signify a certain indefinite plenitude; 2 in the text of Isaiah only six distinct gifts are enumerated, for the gift of fear is mentioned twice.

Some exegetes think that the text of Isaiah refers to an indefinite plenitude and therefore to more than seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Theologians who accept this exegesis will likewise hold for an indefinite number of gifts. An indefinite plenitude may refer to a number that is left undetermined, or it may signify a definite number that contains all possible applications. It is this second sense that St. Thomas seems to accept, for he says that "it is evident that these gifts extend to everything to which the moral and intellectual virtues also extend. Therefore, the indefinite plenitude can be understood as a determined number of gifts possessing multiple modalities.

Various explanations have been offered for the omission of the gift of piety in the text of Isaiah, but it is explicitly mentioned in the patristic tradition, in the official teachings of the Church, and in the unanimous teaching of theologians. To prescind from this weight of authority because of certain textual obscurities would seem to be unwarranted.

Many things formally revealed in Sacred Scripture did not appear in their fullness except through the interpretation of the Fathers and the Magisterium of the Church. Whatever the text of Isaiah, St. Paul describes the reality when he writes to the Romans: "All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God.

You did not receive a spirit of slavery leading you back into fear, but a spirit of adoption through which we cry out, 'Abba! The Spirit himself gives witness with our spirit that we are children of God" Rom. The Nature of the Gifts St. Thomas studies the metaphysical nature of the gifts of the Holy Spirit by asking whether they are habits, 28 in order to determine the proximate genus in the essential definition of the gifts.

The reply is in the affirmative, and theologians of all schools hold for the same response, with few exceptions. Two objections have been raised against the classification of the gifts as habits. Their solution will enable us to see more clearly the nature of the gifts. First, for a person to be moved by the inspiration or instinct of the Holy Spirit an actual grace suffices.

Therefore, the gifts are not habits but actual graces. To this we respond that insofar as the supernatural movement proceeds from the Holy Spirit, it could be classified as an actual grace. On the part of the soul, however, a distinction is necessary. If the Holy Spirit acts upon the soul by bestowing some grace by way of an impulse and such a grace can be offered even to sinners or as a charism gratia gratis data , these graces, as received, are also actual graces. But if the Holy Spirit's action on the soul requires a previous disposition so that the soul may be moved easily and promptly, then the soul needs habits that can be actuated in a supernatural mode, and such are the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, it is commonly taught by theologians that the gifts are the perfection of the infused virtues; therefore, the gifts must, like the virtues, be operative habits. Secondly, it is objected that the Holy Spirit is an infinite agent of operation and needs no previous disposition on the part of the soul. Therefore the gifts are not habits. We reply that we have already admitted that the Holy Spirit can act on a soul however and whenever he wishes.

But the ordinary working of divine providence is smooth and connatural. Moreover, we are faced with the fact of the existence of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit as infused habits, as we have already seen. The Gifts and the Infused Virtues There are numerous characteristics common to both the gifts and the virtues.

The principal ones are as follows: 1. They are generically the same because both are operative habits. They have the same efficient cause, namely, God, and therefore they are both infused supernatural habits. They have the same subject of inhesion: the human faculties. They have the same material object: all moral matter.

For he will not only have to endure pain and suffering, he must aggressively confront the obstacles that stand in the way of achieving his proper good. The courageous person will also display magnificence , that is, a sense of nobility with respect to the importance of his endeavors. Finally, the courageous person will have patience and perseverance. That is, he will not be broken by stress or sorrow, nor will he be wearied or discouraged due to the exigencies of his endeavors Ibid.

The virtues we have considered thus far concern our own state. Specifically, it denotes a sustained or constant willingness to extend to each person what he or she deserves ST IIaIIae Constraints of space, however, force me to mention only two sets of distinctions: 1 legal or general and particular justice, and 2 commutative and distributive justice.

Construed this way, justice is a general virtue which concerns not individual benefits but community welfare. Whatever affects the part also affects the whole. And so whatever is good or harmful for oneself will also be good or harmful for the community of which one is a part. For this reason, we should expect the good community to enact laws that will govern its members in ways that are beneficial to everyone.

This focus—the welfare of the community—is what falls under the purview of legal justice. A clarification is in order. Aquinas acknowledges that legal justice does not appear to be altogether different from the virtues we previously considered.

Whereas legal justice concerns the common good, prudence concerns commanding action, temperance concerns curbing concupiscent passion, and courage concerns strengthening irascible passion against fear. To put the matter as baldly as possible, the purpose of the other virtues is to make us good people ; making us good citizens is the end at which legal justice aims Ibid.

Of course, it would be a mistake to conclude from this account that the other virtues have nothing to do with the common good. For example, restraining impetuous sexual appetite is the province of temperance. Thus Aquinas insists that temperance can do more than just modify our sexual drives. So long as it is shaped or informed by legal justice, temperance can direct us to preserve the common good in our actions ST IIaIIae We can say the same for prudence and courage.

Legal justice must govern all acts of virtue to ensure that they achieve their end in a way that is commensurate with the good of others. Now, we cannot fulfill the demands of justice only by considering what legal or general justice requires.

We also need particular justice—the virtue which governs our interactions with individual citizens. Unlike general justice, particular justice directs us not to the good of the community but to the good of individual neighbors, colleagues, and other people with whom we interact regularly.

Initially, it may appear as if particular justice is a superfluous virtue. It does this by providing us with very general precepts do not steal, do not murder, etc the point of which is to help us preserve the common good in our actions. Yet no situation requiring justice is the same, and thus our considerations of what is just must extend beyond what these general precepts dictate. We must be mindful of individual needs and judicious when applying these precepts. This is why Aquinas insists that the proximate concern of particular justice cannot be the common good but the good of individuals Ibid.

In fulfilling its purpose, however, particular justice is a means of preserving community welfare. Following Aristotle, Aquinas identifies two species of particular justice that deserve attention: commutative and distributive justice. Both seek to preserve equality between persons by giving to each person what is due. Specifically, it seeks to ensure that those who are buying and selling conduct their business fairly In NE V. In other words, the value of a product should be equal to what one pays for that product.

Similarly, a person should be paid an amount that is comparable to the value of what he sells. In short, the kind of equality commutative justice seeks to preserve is a matter of quantity Ibid; In NE V.

This brief account of justice may seem like a stale precursor to more modern accounts of justice, particularly those that depict justice in terms of equality and economic fairness.

Yet a brief survey of the virtues that hinge on justice reveals an account that is richer than the foregoing paragraphs may suggest. The virtues Aquinas has in mind here are not simply those that regulate our relationships with other human beings, but with God.

The same can be said for piety and observance , since they seek to render to God service and deference, respectively. Finally, Aquinas includes both liberality and friendship as parts of justice. Aquinas is often described as a natural law theorist. While natural law is a significant aspect of his moral philosophy, it is a subject of considerable dispute and misunderstanding.

What is the natural law? At a very general level, then, a law is a precept that serves as a guide to and measure of human action. Thus whether an action is good will depend on whether it conforms to or abides by the relevant law. Here we should recall from an earlier section that, for Aquinas, a human action is good or bad depending on whether it conforms to reason. In other words, reason is the measure by which we evaluate human acts. On this view, natural law is but an extension of the eternal law.

For by it God ordains us to final happiness by implanting in us both a general knowledge of and inclination for goodness. Note here that the natural law is not an external source of authority. Nor is it a general deontic norm from which more specific precepts are inferred McInerny, ; Hibbs, As Aquinas understands it, the natural law is a fundamental principle that is weaved into the fabric of our nature. As such, it illuminates and gives us a desire for those goods that facilitate the kind of flourishing proper to human beings ST IaIIae This point deserves further discussion.

They include things like the principle of non-contradiction and law of excluded middle. These principles are indemonstrable in the sense that we do not acquire them from some prior demonstration. To put the matter another way, they are not facts at which we arrive by means of argument or reasoning. They are the principles from which all reasoning proceeds.

In short, human reasoning does not establish the truth of first principles, it depends on them. The natural law functions in a way that is analogous to the aforementioned principles. According to Aquinas, all human actions are governed by a general principle or precept that is foundational to and necessary for all practical reasoning: good is to be done and evil is to be avoided. This principle is not something we can ignore or defy.

Rather, it is an expression of how practical thought and action proceed in creatures such as ourselves. Whenever we deliberate about how we should act, we do so by virtue of a natural inclination to pursue or avoid those goods or evils that contribute to or deter us from our perfection as human beings. The goods for which we have a natural inclination include life, the procreation and education of offspring, knowledge, and a civil social order ST IaIIae Whether there are additional goods that are emblematic of the natural law will depend on whether they in fact contribute to our rational perfection.

A caveat is in order. While we naturally desire goods that facilitate our perfection, excessive passion, unreasonable fear, and self-interest can distort the way we construe those goods ST IaIIae For example, sexual pleasure is a natural good. Also, self-protection is a good to which we naturally incline. Yet unreasonable fear may deter us from acting for the sake of goods that trump personal safety. Poor upbringing and the prejudices of society can further undermine a proper view of what human fulfillment consists in.

Whether we can make competent judgments about what will contribute to our proper fulfillment depends on whether we have the requisite intellectual and moral virtues. Without those virtues, our intellectual and moral deficiencies will forestall our rational perfection and the attainment of our final end. Not only does Aquinas agree that human beings seek their own happiness, he agrees that the virtues are necessary for achieving it. While Aquinas thinks that moral perfection is synonymous with achieving our final end, he construes that end in terms of beatitude , or supernatural union with God ST IIaIIae In keeping with Christian teaching, he also acknowledges that we cannot achieve beatitude solely by means of our own virtuous efforts.

Incomplete happiness is a state we achieve by means of our natural human aptitudes. Through them, we can cultivate some measure of virtue and, in turn, be happier than we would be otherwise. Perfect or complete happiness, however, lies beyond what we are able to achieve on our own.

The theological virtues that facilitate perfect happiness are those listed by St. Paul in the second letter to the Corinthians: faith, hope, and charity. These articles are contained at least implicitly in Scripture and serve as the basis of sacred doctrine. The kind of assent Aquinas has in mind here is not a matter of the intellect alone. It also involves the will. Hope is the virtue whereby we trust God in obtaining final happiness.

But because God is the one in whom final happiness consists and not simply the one who assists us in achieving it , we must look to God as the good we desire to obtain ST IIaIIae Finally, charity is the virtue whereby we love God for his own sake.

He amplifies this idea when he echoing Augustine says that charity is an appetitive state whereby our appetites are uniformly ordered to God ST IIaIIae We should also note here that Aquinas thinks that love of neighbor is included in the love of God. As we just discussed, our efforts to be virtuous may contribute to our general betterment, but they alone cannot bring us to final happiness although they can aid us in this regard, as we will see shortly.

Charity, on the other hand, rectifies our fallen wills; that is, it perfects our deficient inclinations by orienting them toward God as the proper source of our fulfillment.

Moreover, charity affords a supernatural benefit—or gift—that the cardinal virtues could never provide. That benefit is the gift of wisdom. The gift of wisdom should not be confused with the intellectual virtue of the same name.

Knowledge of those causes may include knowledge of God, who is the highest cause of things. Charity, then, inclines one to love God, whose goodness is perfect, unchanging, and eternal. Those who seek happiness in God will be more fulfilled than if they sought happiness in some lesser, transient good.

What makes this account especially interesting for our purposes is that it provides us with a more explicit understanding of the sort of fulfillment in which beatitude consists. This is an important question. Constraints of space, however, permit us to highlight only two such connections. First, charity transforms the virtues themselves. It does this by determining the end at which the virtues aim. Under the auspices of charity, the moral virtues still have the task of moderating our appetites.

The purpose for which they do so, however, is for the sake of God. The second connection is a natural extension of the first, and it helps explain why—even with charity—we need the moral virtues.

According to Aquinas, it is possible for those who love God to sin against charity, especially when moved by desires or fears of an inordinate nature ST IIaIIae For this reason we must practice those virtues that curtail sinful inclinations and enable us to yield to charity more easily ST IaIIae In conjunction with charity, the moral virtues actually aid in our journey to final happiness and thus play an important role in our redemption.

This last point nicely reflects the way Aquinas weds Christian moral theology and Aristotelian philosophy. More generally, it exemplifies the way in which Aquinas took faith and reason to be perfectly compatible.

Of course, the extent to which Aquinas was faithful to Aristotle in his grand synthesis is a subject that must be left for others to address. Shawn Floyd Email: sfloyd malone. The Cardinal Virtues Aquinas offers several definitions of virtue. Prudence In order to act well, we need to make good judgments about how we should behave. Temperance Temperance has a twofold meaning. Courage Temperance and its subsidiary virtues restrain the strong appetite, such as the sexual appetite But courage and its subsidiary virtues modify what Aquinas calls the irascible appetite.

Justice The virtues we have considered thus far concern our own state. Natural Law Aquinas is often described as a natural law theorist. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources Thomas Aquinas, St. Questiones de vertitate QDV. Robert W. Mulligan, S. Henry Regnery Company. Thomas Aquinas, St. Summa contra gentiles SCG , vol.

Anton Pegis. Vernon Bourke. What can account for this consistency? All persons everywhere face difficulties, desire sensual goods, relate to others, and make practical decisions. Living in this world necessarily entails these activities. Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to say that therefore all these voices in the Western tradition share a solitary vision of what is morally right and wrong.

This points us to another observation about the cardinal virtues. The cardinal virtues incline their holder to act well in different areas of life: making practical decisions, desiring pleasures, relating to others, and facing difficulties.

In other words, the brave person i. The chaste person is neither too promiscuous nor too prudish. Virtue lies in the mean. Perhaps we can all agree on this claim that virtue lies in the mean. But this really just pushes back one step further the question of what constitutes good or bad action.

What constitutes promiscuity, or being too prudish? A virtue approach to morality has the advantage of being supple. It can accommodate individual, as well as cultural, differences as to what constitutes, say, temperance concerning alcohol.

What guards against such a contentless morality is the reliance of the virtue approach on paradigmatic actions to exemplify each virtue. That is cowardice. Nonetheless, though a virtue approach to morality is not completely contentless, it is flexible enough to require further specification. And thus identifying the relevant virtue is only the start of this process of discerning how to act well in a particular situation.

For instance, virtue discussions of alcohol use assume there is a mean of temperance, and ways to deviate in excess or defect. But where the lines are drawn is something that needs to be specified through further examination of the particular activity at hand. For what purposes is alcohol being used? How does alcohol impact the body? What social forces are at work inclining one toward or preventing one from alcohol use?

Further prudential reflection, at both the individual and communal levels, serves to further specify the mean of temperate alcohol use. Yet if the cardinal virtues concern inner-worldly activities that are in principle accessible to reason, why are there so many different understandings of what constitutes a just, or brave, or prudent, or temperate act? How can some societies regard hara-kari as honorable and others condemn it as suicide, and wrong? How can societies hold such radically different views of gender or race relations, or of what constitutes virtuous sexuality or alcohol use?

Some individual and communal differences as to what constitutes virtuous action reflect the simple truism that the good life has many expressions. But some differences seem incompatible with each other, and not so easily explained. For instance, what is the true purpose of sexuality? Are men and women truly equal, and if so should that equality be instituted in a society?

Clearly people continue to disagree on this. This does not necessarily mean there is no such thing as temperance or justice. There are many possible explanations for these differences such as malice, ignorance, etc. In other words, what one believes about God does indeed shape how one regards inner-worldly activities, and judges whether or not they are being done well. Of course, all differences about cardinal virtues such as temperance and justice do not boil down to differences of faith.

However, neglecting the impact of faith on how one lives in this world leads to an impoverished view of the cardinal virtues. When one acquires a cardinal virtue, one performs inner-worldly acts well with an eye toward how they contribute to human flourishing. In other words, I drink moderately i. I am generous because I want to contribute not only to my own well-being but also to that of others in my community, since I understand the two as intertwined. People are able to understand, through the use of their reason, natural human flourishing, as it includes things like bodily health and the common good.

Yet, as already hinted at earlier in part 2, Christians believe that humans are invited by God to share in a greater destiny. This is a destiny that far transcends our unaided created nature and unaided powers of reasoning. So how can it be understood or achieved? God gives us the grace to truthfully understand who God is, and his plan for humanity faith. He bestows on us a love of God and others in God, such that we seek to be unified with God in communion with others charity.

He fills us with a longing for that union—tasted in this life and completed in the next—even when it is not fully available to us now hope. What does this have to do with the cardinal virtues? At this point it would seem that the only thing distinguishing Christians and non-Christians is the presence of faith, hope, and love. Christians have the infused theological virtues to guide them to union with God, a supernatural destiny.

But all persons—Christian or not—have the cardinal virtues that are acquired by the process of habituation and direct us to do inner-worldly activities well for the sake of natural human flourishing. On this read, in fact, there is really no difference between how Christians act well in the world and how virtuous non-Christians act well.

There are kernels of truth in saying that Christians and non-Christians both have these acquired cardinal virtues. First of all, for many inner-worldly activities, it simply does not matter whether or not one is Christian.

If you want a good exercise trainer, it is probably not necessary to ask if he or she is Christian! Physical training is an inner-worldly activity accessible to unaided human reason that looks the same for Christians and non-Christians alike. The same is true of many questions of justice. A non-Christian judge can be just as knowledgeable in American law and render just judgments as a Christian judge.

Second, it is true that Christians can work hard to obtain cardinal virtues concerning inner-worldly activities. So Christians can work hard to diet so as to be physically fit, or try to be more patient with people that may annoy us. However, sometimes inner-worldly activities look different for Christians because of their Christian faith. Thomas Aquinas uses the example of fasting.

To make a sacrifice joining us to the ultimate sacrifice of Christ, and to subordinate our more basic desires for the sake of our deeper desire for the Lord, we eat less than we normally do.

This action concerns an inner-worldly activity, i. So fasting Christians are said to be temperate. But on that same day virtuous nonbelievers may eat their standard three square meals.

They, too, are eating temperately. How to explain this difference? Some different virtuous actions are explainable by different circumstances. But that is not the case here. Both actions are temperate, but they differ not due to circumstances but in their very meaning. Nonbelievers are temperate for the sake of natural human flourishing. Christians are temperate for the sake of union with God. So the actions differ in meaning, or ultimate goal. They also differ in source.

Hence in this example we have two different types of virtues: the infused cardinal virtue of temperance fasting during Lent , and the acquired cardinal virtue of temperance three squares a day for the nonbeliever. As for the cardinal virtue justice, surely a virtuous non-Christian can be willing to lay down his life for social justice e.

But a Christian might do this differently. These examples reveal that cardinal virtues, while always concerning inner-worldly activities, actually come in two different stripes. And therefore there are ultimately three types of virtues. First, there are infused theological virtues. Second, there are acquired cardinal virtues. They concern inner-worldly activities.

They are accessible to unaided human reason and acquired by our own efforts. They direct us toward human flourishing considered simply at the level of our created human nature. Finally, there are also infused cardinal virtues. These concern inner-worldly activities as well.