Thomas hobbes why is he important

It brought political modernization to the west by introducing democratic values and institutions and the creation of modern, liberal democracies. Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher and scientist, was one of the key figures in the political debates of the period. Hobbes was the first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed social contract theory that appeared in his work Leviathan. In it, Hobbes set out his doctrine of the foundation of states and legitimate governments and creating an objective science of morality.

As Leviathan was written during the English Civil War, much of the book is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and civil war. Beginning from a mechanistic understanding of human beings and the passions, Hobbes postulates what life would be like without government, a condition which he calls the state of nature. In that state, each person would have a right, or license, to everything in the world.

So, in order to avoid it, people accede to a social contract and establish a civil society. According to Hobbes, society is a population beneath a sovereign authority, to whom all individuals in that society cede some rights for the sake of protection. The individuals are thereby the authors of all decisions made by the sovereign. According to Hobbes, the sovereign must control civil, military, judicial, and ecclesiastical powers.

Thomas Hobbes by John Michael Wright, circa , National Portrait Gallery, London Hobbes was one of the founders of modern political philosophy and political science. Indeed, the chaos of civil war in England cast a strong shadow over his collected writings. Anarchy is an unpleasant state of transition that must be superseded to arrive at a civilized state of existence.

The Leviathan takes issue with the foundations of the commonwealth, a manifestation of the advent of civil society, in which the imperatives and principles of anarchy no longer hold. Hence, after leaving his discussion of anarchy in Chapters , he goes on to speak of the commonwealth in the context of constructivist and neoliberal categories: cooperation, law, rights, morality and even religion.

But to say that Hobbes was, above all, concerned with the foundations of civil society as embodied in law, morality and religion is not to incriminate the realists with respect to having misunderstood Hobbes.

Few realists would in fact disagree on this point. But the realists are not interested in what happens in a state of civil society, since for them, this civil state does not represent an analogy for the international system.

If we are going to claim any vindication about Hobbesian respect for non-realist categories which are embodied in neoliberalism and constructivism, it must be within those very core discussions about anarchy that have been hailed by realists as inspirations for their theoretical leanings. In essence, the method employed here would be one of crucial-case textual analysis, where cases are selected because of their especially salient characteristics.

Such a method would generate more compelling inferences notwithstanding low-n settings i. So in this particular instance, if indeed Hobbes himself embraces elements of neoliberalism or constructivism, we should least expect to find any such support for these ideas in the principal passages from Leviathan on anarchy.

But finding such support in these passages would reveal an especially compelling vindication for revisionist claims i. A slew of critiques have underscored the problems of using Hobbesian anarchy as a platform upon which to construct a theory of relations among sovereign states.

However, it is precisely here that a clear idea of the mechanics of how possibilities for cooperation i. In demonstrating the cosmopolitan or more diverse nature of the vision of Hobbesian anarchy, we must begin with reason.

For Hobbes, humans are born with, and develop, reason L, V. Reason, for Hobbes, is an element through which individuals discover the means of self-preservation. Two laws of nature reveal themselves. Here in the latter lies the operational rule that brings about the famous Hobbesian contract, which brings forth a Leviathan, as the right to all things is commensurate with human freedom under anarchy.

Once given up, humans arrive at a state of civil society and happily exit the chaos of anarchy. Is peace obtainable in anarchy? The immediate passages beyond Chapter 13 in Leviathan starkly attest to the fact that peace is indeed attainable in anarchy. The chapter begins with a note on the implication of covenants or contracts for human co-existence: they are the foundation upon which the very existence of civil society thrives.

But here, Hobbes introduces a monumental shift in his logic of anarchy when he immediately follows section 3 with the story of the fool. Were it against reason to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it L, XV, 4. After a passage in which Hobbes assails the argument on the grounds that such reasoning has heretofore validated a history of mass violence e. Italics added. Of course, if the critique of the fool should stop here, it would be easy enough to discard it because of the allusion to religion, which exists independent of the state of anarchy.

While God exists under conditions of both anarchy and civil society, religion is never introduced as a constraint against the brutish behaviour characterizing anarchy. But Hobbes continues. Indeed, his critique of the fool goes on to squarely confront this religious barbarism in the context of his logic of anarchy.

This is so because he lays emphasis on the impact of such thinking on the possibilities of a covenant, the very thumbscrew upon which the logic of anarchy and civil society turns.

The logic unfolds in section 5 of Chapter For the question is not promises mutual where there is no security of performance on either side as when there is no civil power erected over the parties promising , for such promises are no covenants, but either where one of the parties has performed already , or where there is a power to make him perform, there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform or not..

And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof we are to consider: first, when a man doth a thing which, notwithstanding anything can be unforeseen and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction…. Secondly, that in a condition of war wherein every man to every man for want of a common power to keep them all in awe is an enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself without the help of confederates where everyone expects the same defence by the confederation that everyone else does ; and therefore, he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power.

He, therefore, that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defence but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained in it without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man cannot reasonable reckon upon as the means of his security; and therefore, if he be left or cast out of society, he perisheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee nor reckon upon; and consequently [he has acted] against the reason of his preservation, and so men that contribute not to his destruction forebear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

Indeed, Hobbes conceives of a situation in anarchy itself where people may enter into a covenant, which comprises exchanging promises, thus creating bilateral obligations to perform. If this is the case, then the very logic applicable to relations in civil society is also relevant in a state of anarchy.

Reason reveals compelling laws of nature which consummate some system of peaceful co-existence manifest in a covenant Malcolm His penchant for reciprocity is highlighted in a biblical passage within the context of consummating a covenant. Beyond these moral elements driving reciprocity within covenants in anarchy, the passage clearly reveals a strategic element of cooperation among self-interested actors.

So whatever general moral orientations are tied up with the use of reason, they are overlaid with instrumentally rational considerations of cooperation in a condition of anarchy. And this is quite apparent as his response to the fool continues. Toward the middle of section 4 in Chapter 15, Hobbes lays out the logic of the fool in this context.

Hence there is an admission that cooperation could be forged on the basis of some interactive rule, but the fool sees any such cooperation as non-compelling because of the lack of divine sanction.

Here Hobbes is introducing a human element of sanction, but does not yet spell out the precise nature of such punishment for defection as he does afterward in section 5. And it is this very defection represented by the logic of the fool that Hobbes castigates. From here on, the logic in section 5 of Chapter 15 manifests common neoliberal, game theoretic ideas regarding the possibilities of cooperation in variable-sum games.

Keeping the fool as the main protagonist, it is evident that his logic does not bode well for his survival in anarchy because even in a world without a divine presence, there are consequences for defection which punish the transgressor. But Hobbes also introduces temporal and informational dimensions which also undermine the debilitating consequences of the idea of anarchy that realists have traditionally embraced i. It is clear from the ability of the group to cast out defectors that the game does not end there for either, although the consequences of such a divorce are asymmetrical.

Indeed the fool will go on to seek another group, which must by definition exist in anarchy because a commonwealth has not yet been formed: if the group, Hobbes refers to, were singular then it would in fact be that very covenant that forms the commonwealth.

The iteration manifests itself in a somewhat modified way. If we think of iteration in strategic situations according to the classic articulation of Axelrod , socialization of defectors comes through iterated play between the same individuals over some period of time which is indeterminate.

Hence, socialization takes place through the shadow of the future that infinite iteration generates: it will not pay for an individual to continue defecting when the time horizon is infinite. Indeed, the fool would have been cast out of his protective confederation and then must look elsewhere. This would serve the same socialization function as iteration in an Axelrodian context. The results would be similar in both contexts: both those that stay in the group and potential defectors would continue to face incentives to cooperate Kafka Reason for Hobbes is oriented, as noted above, towards self-preservation.

This evokes not only a clear understanding of yourself, but also how others will behave in response to your actions. It would be clear to the defector by way of reason that others would not be so ignorant of his threat to them as they too have reason.

But the shadow of the future may not end with the boundaries of anarchy. In this case, such a possibility might modify the payoffs in the iterated game but would not fundamentally change the form of the strategic interaction.

Interestingly, the possibility of some end-point in the iteration resulting in the commonwealth could even introduce an element of a chain-store paradox into the process. The logic propounded by Hobbes in his response to the fool proposes a drastically different process of strategic interaction than the one adopted by realists from his literal treatment of anarchy in Chapter This is because of the individual optimality of defection no matter what the others do, you are better off defecting.

In fact, you are left with an entirely different scenario of human interaction. The possibility of fooling members of the confederation and exploiting them without bearing the consequences is vitiated by reason, as noted above. Of course, one could try to exploit some confederation in order to acquire some material gain which he or she can carry with them to another confederation.

And here Hobbes is silent on whether different confederations actually share information about defectors, so that there may be a possibility of moving from confederation to confederation while accumulating the spoils from the suckers. But this would be a bold move indeed, as spoils themselves could not be greater than one could carry upon their person, and the risk of doing so exposes the defector to death, which for Hobbes, is certain.

But what of a situation where some of the members of the confederation exploit those cooperative individuals who subscribe to Hobbesian reason? Should reciprocity also be the rule here? In a case where members of the confederation are exploiting each other, reason will surely compel the third-party members not involved in the exploitation to cast the defectors out to perish.

Even as a reciprocal act, defection will still confer a reputation of being unreliable. But suppose the defectors are numerous enough to create their own protective confederation so that they can reduce individual vulnerability?

In the process they are not so fearful of being cast out of the confederation. This would be illogical as cooperation must undergird a confederation for it to carry out its protective function effectively, and it would not be expedient to build such cooperation among a group of people that have a history of trying to exploit each other.

So this splinter confederation would either be killed or kill itself off. One may indeed face death from such exploitation from defectors in the confederation, yet this is not assured.

For Hobbes this means certain death. But even if death is not certain, response in kind may still be inferior because it brands you as a defector, which is sure to get you expelled. Anything short of death introduces probabilistic thinking that would lean toward cooperation. Would I rather be wounded in a confederation or in the wilds of anarchy?

Here the choice would be clear. An individual is always better off staying loyal to the confederation no matter what anyone else does. Indeed, if one were to decompose strategic thinking in actors according to different modes as spelt out by Kafka , maxi-minimization, maximization and disaster-avoidance should deliver the same preference ordering, as all three would be directed towards cooperation as a dominant strategy.

The parallels between confederations in anarchy and the commonwealth are most apparent here. In civil society, there can only be one strategy for Hobbes: the dominant strategy of cooperation.

Any sort of defection, even as a response in kind to exploitation assume one kills a person who stole from them is punished through law. So too, in anarchy, does the idea of confederation restrict the choices. Hobbes, Constructivism, Neoliberalism and International Relations. A number of neoliberal and constructivist scholars have critically scrutinized the application of the realist assumption of anarchy.

These conditions are: the evolution of norms, possibilities for reciprocity shadows of the future , reputations for honouring commitments and rules credibility , consistency in behaviour, shying away from unilateral postures, conceiving of state interests in the context of joint utility mutuality of interests , the number of actors involved, availability of information, linkages, variable perceptions, and domestic politics.

The very conditions cited above they most embrace are fully manifest in the process of cooperation reflected in Hobbesian confederations in anarchy. First, international confederations can be vehicles for promoting national interests and protection.

Repeated interactions convey information about possibilities for cooperation and promote processes of socialization i. Second, functional interdependence makes cooperation important for realizing mutual gains in that nations co-exist within some form of a division of labour.

The need for cooperation is capable of generating norms that then form a life of their own, and thus enhance possibilities for cooperation. The realist assumption of functional equality does not reflect the real world, hence behaving like a classical Hobbesian brute and relying only on self-help denies nations many advantages consistent with their national interests Milner Finally, strategic interdependence renders the fate of nations intertwined in a more fundamental sense than visions of independence in anarchy Milner and Schelling Indeed, Brahms reinforces the possibilities of strategic gains through magnanimity self-restraint and cooperation even in games that present significant risks of exploitation.

As with Hobbesian confederations, all three aspects of the utility of cooperation suggest that there is no fundamental disjuncture between individual and communal goals. Such an approach to norms suggests one of the best foundations for a synthesis between neoliberals and constructivists. Norms develop as coordinating devices to enhance cooperation, and as time passes they gain a life of their own which is distinct from instrumental rationality.

Given the utility of cooperation in anarchy, soft power which embraces both constructivist and neoliberal categories becomes a valuable asset in the portfolios that nations construct to enhance their influence in world politics Gallarotti and Nye, Such reputation makes one less menacing, thus mitigating security-dilemma reactions that might lead to the emergence of adversaries.

Respect for rules and norms, both in its domestic and international manifestations, enhances cooperative reputation in maximizing potential allies and supporters, as well as minimizing enemies. Moreover, it is not clear that policies designed to minimize such outcomes through the mitigation of soft power taking a harder line as realism might prescribe would, in the long run, yield better net benefits than strategies that might accept such risks. Since a more hard-line position would generate menacing consequences also, it is not at all certain that these will not be worse than the consequences of exploitation.

Either way, one will be faced with some risk, irrespective of the power orientation one pursues, in maximizing influence. In any event, short of outright destruction or conquest, an iterated process would follow any exploitative act, thus creating shadow-of-the-future effects that would discourage such acts Axelrod, In view of the utility of soft power, any strategy that would discount such resources in favour of a strict pursuance of hard power in a classically realist mode very much risks victimization through power illusion Gallarotti, and a.

As Hobbes lays out his thoughts on the foundation of states and legitimate government, he does it methodically: The state is created by humans, so he first describes human nature.

He says that in each of us can be found a representation of general humanity and that all acts are ultimately self-serving--that in a state of nature, humans would behave completely selfishly. He concludes that humanity's natural condition is a state of perpetual war, fear and amorality, and that only government can hold a society together.

After his return to England in , Hobbes continued to write. De Corpore was published in , and De Homine was published in , completing the Elements of Philosophy trilogy. In his later years, Hobbes turned his attention to a boyhood favorite--classics--publishing translations of Homer's The Odyssey and The Iliad.

Hugely influential, Hobbes' ideas form the building blocks of nearly all Western political thought, including the right of the individual, the importance of republican government, and the idea that acts are allowed if they are not expressly forbidden. The historical importance of his political philosophy cannot be overstated, as it went on to influence the likes of John Locke , Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant , to name a few. We strive for accuracy and fairness. If you see something that doesn't look right, contact us!

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