What is the difference between replevin and trover

Brannon, 51 Conn. Peck, Ind. Stofferan, 39 Ill. In replevin there was no claim for damages as such, but only for the immediate possession of the property. This delivery of the property on the first process is one of the main differences between replevin and other forms of action.

In trespass and trover the property was never delivered to plaintiff. If successful, the fruit of his victory was only an ordinary judgment for so much money. Replevin, too, can be used under circumstances under which the other forms of action could not. Thus a simple omission or refusal to deliver goods rightfully in one's possession would not furnish ground for an action of trespass, but might furnish ample ground for replevin.? Trespass will not lie against one who came rightfully into the possession of the goods of another, even though it should turn out that the party who delivered them to him was a wrongdoer.

Or where a bailee of goods sells and delivers them without authority, such sale and delivery conveys no title to the purchaser; and replevin would lie, but trespass could not be maintained. Or if an infant sell and deliver property, he can avoid the sale and bring replevin, but trespass will not lie. Richards, 45 Ala. Phinney, 15 Mass. Morrow, 14 Ark. Clark, 2 Bulst. Mitchell, 31 Wis. Warren, 3 Hill N. Barker, 4 Barn. Davis, 1 Wend. Mosher, 19 Wend. Van Horn, 15 Wend. Stafford, 7 Cow.

Cook, 2 Shep. Reed, 4 Grey, ; Hickey v. Hinsdale, 12 Mich. Buswell, 54 Me. Rose, 2 Comst. Roberts, 50 N. Welbey, 36 Wis. West, 7 Cow. McGowen, 13 Wend. Warner, 19 Ohio, 29; Marsh v. White, 3 Barb. Taylor, 9 Humph. Boyle, 22 Me. Hubbard, 18 Vt. Jones, 9 Humph. Lyon, 10 Yerg. It would remain this way until the case of Shmueli v. Corcoran Group. Over her five-year tenure at Corcoran, Shmueli maintained computer records of all the real estate deals she had participated in, prior to and independent of her association with Corcoran.

When she was fired on March 18, , her computer access codes were taken; she was denied access to all of her computer records, client lists and curriculum vitae. Shmueli sued, inter alia, for the conversion of these computer records. Shmueli is significant for being the first New York State court case to allow a cause of action sounding in conversion for the loss of intangible property. While, as the court noted, intangible property could be converted if it were represented in a tangible form, the law had not expanded conversion to cover property without such representation.

The court refused to draw the traditional distinction between documents in digital format and those written on paper. The Shmueli court held that conversion applies to an electronic record as much as it applies to a paper record because of the expedience by which the latter can become the former.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ruled that electronic records that were indistinguishable from printed documents were subject to the claim of conversion. Those records included customer contacts and related data.

Rather than declare that intangible property was convertible, the Court of Appeals' decision reshaped the tort of conversion to encompass intangible records or documents which could otherwise be expressed in tangible form. Notably, the court did not rule that ideas could not be converted, as it had held in Astroworks v.

With Thyroff following Shmueli's holding, New York's common-law tort of conversion now encompasses digital, electronic and virtual information. Despite this expansion, lower courts have remained hesitant to stray from the new law and continue to require traditional elements associated with conversion's dominion requirement to use the property at all times and in all places. In one such case, the plaintiff alleged that "defendants wrongfully copied and displayed material, including images of handbags, from her website and improperly displayed said material on other locations o[f] the web, without her permission The Supreme Court of New York County did not expand the tort to include the taking of pictures from one's website.

Similarly, in MP Innovations v. Atlantic Horizon Intl, plaintiff alleged defendant converted a product, system and formula of which plaintiff was the rightful owner. Again, the Supreme Court of New York County held that the scope of conversion had not been expanded to include information which had never been fixed in a digital or virtual form.

Plaintiff's argument to read Thyroff broadly failed. The Court of Appeals has yet to expand the ruling to other forms of information not fixed in digital or virtual form. Shmueli and Thyroff remain the farthest the New York courts have gone in expanding conversion to digital or intangible property. Today, some traditional rules and elements of conversion remain intact even though neither Shmueli nor Thyroff addressed them.

For example, plaintiffs must be denied "any and all" use of their property in order to recover under conversion; being denied exclusive use will not suffice. When a plaintiff is denied dominion over the thing in question, the item is altered or the plaintiff's rights are excluded. As it stands, in order to maintain a successful cause of action for the conversion of an intangible item in New York four elements must be met: 1 the plaintiff must have ownership of the converted item; 2 the intangible item must be recorded in digital or virtual format and must be indistinguishable from its printed or physical form; 3 the plaintiff must be unlawfully denied dominion or control of the thing; and 4 there must be resulting damages.

Originating as an appeal in 11th century England, conversion has done away with many of its traditional elements. While some remain, Shmueli and Thyroff have extended conversion's protection to intangible property. Though subsequent cases have limited the holdings in Shmueli and Thyroff, plaintiffs can now recover the full value of their converted item at the time of the tort. Andrea M. Alonso and Kevin G. Harris Peskin, a paralegal, assisted in the preparation of this article. Endnotes: 1.

See Sporn v. MCA Records, 58 N. Texas is one jurisdiction that has yet to depart from the traditional distinction. See Express One Int'l v. Steinbeck, 53 S. See J. See id. Hill, supra note 5, at ; See Val D. The defendant could not claim as an excuse that the property belonged to someone not involved in the lawsuit because the only issue before the court was rightful possession, not title. For example, an executor of an estate could seek replevy of racehorses boarded by the decedent if the owner of the stable refused to release them.

It would be no defense that the executor was not the owner of the horses. Unlike trover, the plaintiff was not bound to prove that the defendant had converted the goods to his or her own use, only that the defendant wrongfully refused to give them up.

Unlike trespass, the defendant in an action to replevy goods was not claiming that he or she owned the property, only that he or she was entitled to hold on to it rather than give it to the plaintiff.