What is the difference between legitimacy and sovereignty

The modern theory of sovereignty was first introduced by a French political philosopher Jean Bodin in to which has now been converted to political theory by political scientists, Hobbies, Grotius, Locke, Bentham, Rousseau, John Austin and many more.

Sovereignty is defined as the absolute power of the state to exercise supreme legal authority over its own affairs within its territory without any form of external control. This is a lesson from the tutorial, Introduction to Government and you are encouraged to log in or register , so that you can track your progress. Log In. Register or login to receive notifications when there's a reply to your comment or update on this information.

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Contact the organisation Opens in new window. Partners 1 Sort alphabetically. Sort by EU Contribution. Expand all. Make people to accept a government as a legitimate one and also the acceptance of common heroes and heroines determine legitimacy.

That is the reason why some military administration seek to legitimize their government by trying to implement good policies. Sovereignty : is defined as the absolute power of the state to exercise supreme legal authority over its own affairs within its territory without any form of external control.

A sovereign state hence has absolute power to make and enforce laws within its territory without any external influence. The modern theory of sovereignty was first introduced by a French political philosopher Jean Bodin in to which is now be converted to political theory by political scientists , Hobbies, Grotius, Locke, Bentham, Rousseau, John Austin and many more. The Government and its officials may change but sovereignty does not change. This characteristics is also known as limitlessness.

The people exercise this power through the ballot box by voting for those they want to delegate the power to. Political sovereignty is also known as popular sovereignty. As a conclusion, I will therefore point to aspects and criteria which to a large extent remain obscured — or are intentionally obscured — in current debates, which, however, one should not carelessly fall back behind 3.

Sovereignty, understood as the main characteristic of the modern state, has been developed in its most concise and most influential form in the political theories of Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau. They represent important historical stages in the development of the modern state between the 16 th and 18 th century and the theoretical as well as normative ways of pondering about and legitimizing it.

All differences in details aside, their theories establish definitions of structures and problems as well as responsibilities of the state, politics and the law which at present are far from being outdated. In the following I shall examine to what extent this is true for the problem of sovereignty as well. After a brief reconstruction of the conception of sovereign power developed by the theorists in discussion which seems to confirm the critical aspects mentioned above and its relation to society 2.

On this basis, it becomes clear that linked to this concept of sovereignty are conditions of individual and collective liberty 2. By means of the concept of sovereignty, as coined by Bodin and adopted and further developed by Hobbes and Rousseau, a change of paradigm takes place in justifying political authority and the relationship between state and society, which as such only come into existence by virtue of this change.

It stands for its specific modern justification. The modern state differs from medieval forms of governing not only by a quantitative surplus of centralized authoritarian rights, powers and means of effective government. The crucial fact is rather that a whole new structure comes into existence with regard to justificatory grounds and point of reference for any legitimate government.

In the medieval order, authoritarian rights and the legal exercise of power are considered as being of specific benefit for a multitude of actors as well as being legitimized by the order of things as derived from God, nature or tradition.

It is from this view that the various bearers of rights derived their conviction to independently have them at their disposal and be able to defend them, as particular rights, against each other. Here, rights and liberties are privileges one owns by way of birth, being a member of a particular class or corporation, or on other bases, yet always as opposed to others.

Right and liberty do not exist as universal , but only in the plural as particular rights and liberties of particular societal actors and institutions. It does not simply gather up these rights, add them up and lay claim on them — even though this might historically and empirically have been the way in which princes obtained support for their claimed right to power —, but puts them on a new basis: the single, universal will of the sovereign.

Sovereignty is not a cumulative but a constitutive concept. Any legitimate government, any right and any legal exercise of power in societal relations have as their origin and their validating foundation the will of the sovereign being, the sole bearer of sovereignty. There may be not a single equal power, either beside or even above the sovereign power. The distinguishing marks of sovereignty are analytically tied to the existence and conditions of the realization of state government.

It is this legislating will which makes for the difference between the being and non-being of the state. The final decision is up to the ruling of the sovereign. From this, one can see the structure of sovereign statehood and its minimum conditions as a political corporation which gets its unity and structure out of being subject to the forming will of the sovereign power.

This will provides it with its law, against which there is no other law, since the author of all positive law cannot in turn be bound by the law itself. Above all, however, the sovereign represents the will of the individuals subordinate to him. According to Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau, this legal justification and position of the sovereign power is the basis for having at its disposition all means, institutions and proceedings it deems necessary for the organization and regulation of all societal relations, i.

Yet, as I want to show in what is to come, it would be a historically, systematically and normatively at least foreshortened and problematic account of things to accept this grounding and definition of sovereignty in early modern times.

Much as has been indicated about central elements and functions in the identifications sketched so far, less has been said in order to achieve an adequate understanding of this structure of political power. It is, of course, crucial to adequately register the systematic meaning of this historic societal classification of the mentioned concepts.

The early modern theorists make no secret of the fact that their respective determinations of the necessity of a sovereign power have arisen out of the historically concrete problems.

Bodin develops his conception in the midst of the religious civil wars, and explicitly recommends it as a remedy for bringing back under control the state ship which is about to shatter. Yet situating these constructional forms of sovereign rule within their historic and social context is far more than establishing these temporal references, as their meaning is neither limited to historically factual experience and purposes nor to their relations in the context of contemporary discourse.

Firstly, they reflect the systematic social problems, structures and developments, which have been quarreled and fought about in the conflicts of their time in theory and praxis, sometimes literally by words and weapons.

Secondly, by doing the former, they gave them a theoretical form which could be used for the analysis, understanding and practical-normative orientation within this newly evolving social order. The classifications of the evolving modern state as a sovereign power, made in political theory since the end of the 16 th century, are based on the new experience of fundamentally conflictive social relations and in need for its regulation.

The religious civil wars, the political and social conflicts between princes, feudal, local or corporative actors give expression to the order of the medieval world having lost its cohesive power. The pre-political normative and institutional systems of a world legitimated by feudal rights, tradition and Christian values are no longer able to provide a common system of reference for thought and action, or to meet newly evolving social demands and interests.

The institutions as well as ideas of the modern state are the result of a redefinition of the political in a new form of society which may be characterized by pluralization and secularization.

As the medieval social order was essentially based on Christianity, communicated by the institutions of the one Church claiming universal validity, it is broken open in the course of the Reformation by the growing pluralism of religiously founded parties which each advocate their own absolute, transcendent claims of truth and faith.

For associated with them are different ideas about the organization of individual and common life, ideas in which — seen from a sociological perspective — new social interests and powers make themselves heard and claim acceptance. These developments result in a secularization of the political, which, however, is not necessarily accompanied by a turning away from religion as such — as is shown by the fact that, at least for a long time, religious content and justification of political and social institutions remain of prime importance.

To the extent, however, in which the inconsistency of religious claims to truth and the general impossibility of agreeing on truth and liability become sufficiently tangible, the political arises as an independent sphere and activity.

As far as they become a part of the social parties and conflicts of interest, their respective social validity, position and significance have themselves to be decided politically. Yet, these decisions about the foundations and orientation of society thus become transparent in a novel way: they are visible in their contingency for the first time, so to speak.

Under these circumstances, the institutions, norms and purposes constituting society necessarily lose the character of being predetermined by tradition and transcendent eternity. They now are something that needs to be decided about — one way or another, and ever anew —, something that needs to be decided about by specific individuals or groups and hence becomes clearly attributable.

Historically, the modern state and its sovereign power are established by their advocates, and justified in political discourse by precisely this function of founding social order. From a systemic perspective, political decisions in a society becoming ever more complex are gradually externalized and centralized since early modern times, which are themselves characterized by a growing number of social, religious, cultural, economic and other actors, interests, practices and functional systems.

The state acts, as it were, as a service provider for a variety of heterogeneous interests — even though, in effect, for a long time mostly according to its own pretence rather than actual fact it guarantees social peace by means of its power monopoly, generates and secures the conditions for as well as the limits of the individual and collective pursuit of interests by means of a common legal system, and establishes the prerequisites for social progress and prosperity by means of taking the respective measures.

Yet, the relation between state and society is not to be mistaken for a purely superficial and one-dimensional one.

However little the state is opposed here to society from the outside and above, and however little it exists independently of society and may arbitrarily govern it, no more may the relation between state and society be seen as purely instrumental and functionalistic. Rather, modern state and modern society originate and function by way of a mutually constitutive relationship: the state is the prerequisite and functional condition for the existence of society, yet at the same time also the product of this society which is characterized by plurality and heterogeneity.

It is both, a condition and something conditioned. Indeed, this may be observed ever since the developing central powers have been described, conceptualized, and finally organized in terms of the state. Accordingly, this sovereign power of the state, seeming — and actually being — threatening and absolutist, is necessarily and in an ambiguous manner related to society, and determined by it.

On the one hand, it is centralized governing. Society with its plurality of actors and acting structures is imposed by the state with particular rules and demands, which are equally valid and binding for everybody, and are enforced if necessary. To the extent that each of these decisions is a decision for and against particular norms, values, interests and purposes, state government as such is always particular.

For in a society characterized by the irreconcilable opposition of interests as well as norms, which is just not vested by default with convictions and institutions establishing and securing unity, any universality is at the same time also inevitably a particularity forced upon it. Yet, the crucial aspect here is the way these structures and contents of state government — being both universal and particular — are being generated.