Gyasi heard trial

Heard was also provided a two-level reduction based upon his acceptance of responsibility and an additional one-level reduction because he assisted authorities in the investigation of the offense. Overall, Heard was assessed a total offense level of 35, resulting in a guideline imprisonment range from to months. PSR at 14, Heard was then sentenced to months' imprisonment on each count with the terms to run concurrently to be followed by five years' supervised release.

Heard did not file a direct appeal of his judgment and sentence. On March 10, , Heard filed the instant motion raising five grounds for relief under 28 U. Although the instant motion was not filed until March 10, , Heard contends that he originally mailed his motion in November In accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section Cases, the Court undertook a preliminary review of the motion and directed the government to address the timeliness of the motion.

CV Docs. Thereafter, the government provided the requisite discovery response on July 18, , to which Heard replied on August 18, The judgment in Heard's criminal case was entered on November 20, See Murphy v. United States, F. The Court did not receive Heard's Motion until March 10, , and the mailing envelope is postmarked March 6, , about four months late.

Apparently recognizing the untimeliness of his motion, Heard filed a "Motion to Accept 28 U. Heard declares that he originally mailed his motion on November 2, , but the motion must have been lost by the post office, the Bureau of Prisons, or the clerk's office. In support of his contention, Heard submitted his own sworn affidavit in which he averred that he mailed his motion with the appropriate postage on November 2, Insufficient evidence exists on which to determine whether Heard actually placed his motion in the general prison mail system before the time to file his motion expired.

Generally, "a pro se prisoner's motion to vacate is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing," regardless of whether the motion is ever received by the court.

Adams v. Culliver, F. If a prisoner satisfies the requirements of Rule 3 d , the burden shifts to the government to establish that the prisoner did not actually deliver his motion to prison authorities on the date asserted. Allen, F. Sec'y Dep't of Corr.

May 1, same. Heard concedes that he did not utilize FCI Oakdale's system designed for legal or special mail. Rather, Heard contends that he utilized the prison's general mail system because the system for special or legal mail was unavailable to him at the time that he sought to mail his motion as part of a pattern and practice of the institution in contravention of its written policies.

Notwithstanding Heard's allegations, the government provided documentation that FCI Oakdale has a special or legal mail system available to its prisoners, and that, on or about the time that Heard sought to mail his motion, the specialized system was utilized by other inmates seeking to send legal or special mail. A; CV Doc. Because the specialized mail system was available to inmates at FCI Oakdale, Heard failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 3 d , which precludes application of the mailbox rule.

See Solis-Caceres v. United States, No. July 9, concluding that a prisoner did not receive the benefit of the mailbox rule because he did not comply with Rule 3 d by utilizing his prison's legal mail system. Consequently, Heard's motion is time-barred.

Had Heard's petition been timely, it still would have failed because it lacks merit. By way of explanation to Heard why this is so, the Court briefly discusses the claims. Section sets forth the framework for reviewing a federal prisoner's sentence for any of the following four reasons: 1 the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States; 2 the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence; 3 the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or 4 the sentence is otherwise subject to a collateral attack.

Case law establishes that only constitutional claims, jurisdictional claims, and claims of error so fundamental as to have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice are cognizable on collateral attack. See United States v.

Addonizio, U. United States, U. As a preliminary matter, Heard's claims in this regard are barred by the procedural default rule. The procedural default rule may bar all claims raised by a defendant, including constitutional claims. Lynn, F. Farley, U. Two exceptions to the procedural default rule exist: 1 for cause and prejudice, or 2 a miscarriage of justice. McKay, F. Campbell, F. Thus, a movant's procedural default can be excused by showing that he or she is actually innocent of either the crime of conviction or, in the capital sentencing context, the sentence itself.

United States, Fed. App'x , 11th Cir. Similarly, Heard has neither alleged nor demonstrated cause and prejudice for the failure to appeal these claims.

See Burke v. As such, Heard would not have been entitled to relief on any of these grounds. More specifically, Heard contends that the Court incorrectly found that he did not qualify for the safety valve provision because of a "lack of candor" and that such finding violated his rights under the First Amendment. First, Heard's argument is a challenge to his sentence cloaked as a constitutional issue, therefore, for the reasons discussed more thoroughly above, Heard's argument is barred by the procedural default rule.

Second, even if his argument were not procedurally barred, it would be fundamentally flawed. See also U. To qualify for application of the safety valve provision, Heard must meet the following five requirements:.

PSR at 8, Consequently, the Court did not err, and Heard would not have been entitled to relief on this ground. Finally, Heard claims that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to 1 challenge the sentence enhancement applied under U.

In Strickland v. Heard did not file a direct appeal of his judgment and sentence. On March 10, , Heard filed the instant motion raising five grounds for relief under 28 U.

Although the instant motion was not filed until March 10, , Heard contends that he originally mailed his motion in November In accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section Cases, the Court undertook a preliminary review of the motion and directed the government to address the timeliness of the motion.

CV Docs. Thereafter, the government provided the requisite discovery response on July 18, , to which Heard replied on August 18, The judgment in Heard's criminal case was entered on November 20, See Murphy v. United States, F. The Court did not receive Heard's Motion until March 10, , and the mailing envelope is postmarked March 6, , about four months late. Apparently recognizing the untimeliness of his motion, Heard filed a "Motion to Accept 28 U. Heard declares that he originally mailed his motion on November 2, , but the motion must have been lost by the post office, the Bureau of Prisons, or the clerk's office.

In support of his contention, Heard submitted his own sworn affidavit in which he averred that he mailed his motion with the appropriate postage on November 2, Insufficient evidence exists on which to determine whether Heard actually placed his motion in the general prison mail system before the time to file his motion expired.

Generally, "a pro se prisoner's motion to vacate is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing, " regardless of whether the motion is ever received by the court. Adams v. Culliver, F. A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution's internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing.

If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, the inmate must use that system to receive the benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.

If a prisoner satisfies the requirements of Rule 3 d , the burden shifts to the government to establish that the prisoner did not actually deliver his motion to prison authorities on the date asserted. Allen, F. Sec'y Dep't of Corr. May 1, same. Heard concedes that he did not utilize FCI Oakdale's system designed for legal or special mail. Rather, Heard contends that he utilized the prison's general mail system because the system for special or legal mail was unavailable to him at the time that he sought to mail his motion as part of a pattern and practice of the institution in contravention of its written policies.

Notwithstanding Heard's allegations, the government provided documentation that FCI Oakdale has a special or legal mail system available to its prisoners, and that, on or about the time that Heard sought to mail his motion, the specialized system was utilized by other inmates seeking to send legal or special mail.

A; CV Doc. Because the specialized mail system was available to inmates at FCI Oakdale, Heard failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 3 d , which precludes application of the mailbox rule. See Solis-Caceres v. United States, No.

July 9, concluding that a prisoner did not receive the benefit of the mailbox rule because he did not comply with Rule 3 d by utilizing his prison's legal mail system. Consequently, Heard's motion is time-barred. Had Heard's petition been timely, it still would have failed because it lacks merit. By way of explanation to Heard why this is so, the Court briefly discusses the claims. Section sets forth the framework for reviewing a federal prisoner's sentence for any of the following four reasons: 1 the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States; 2 the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence; 3 the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or 4 the sentence is otherwise subject to a collateral attack.

Case law establishes that only constitutional claims, jurisdictional claims, and claims of error so fundamental as to have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice are cognizable on collateral attack.