Median voter game theory

Finally, we discuss why in such coordination problems--unlike in prisoners' dilemmas--simply communicating may be a remedy. We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

Very interesting class, I wish the video resolution were a little better as it is very difficult to read the professor's writing on the board. I enjo this studying method cause i can think and write and listen at the same time and ask questions and it will be answered cause the depth of the course!

Apple Podcasts Preview. OCT 9, video 01 - Introduction: five first lessons 01 - Introduction: five first lessons We introduce Game Theory by playing a game. OCT 9, video 02 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes 02 - Putting yourselves into other people's shoes At the start of the lecture, we introduce the "formal ingredients" of a game: the players, their strategies and their payoffs. OCT 9, video 03 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem 03 - Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem We apply the main idea from last time, iterative deletion of dominated strategies, to analyze an election where candidates can choose their policy positions.

OCT 9, video 04 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships 04 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships We continue the idea from last time of playing a best response to what we believe others will do.

OCT 9, video 05 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs 05 - Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs We first define formally the new concept from last time: Nash equilibrium. OCT 9, video 06 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot 06 - Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes.

Customer Reviews. Top Podcasts In Business. The Ramsey Show. Ramsey Network. Planet Money. Andy Frisella to0. Jocko Podcast. BiggerPockets Real Estate Podcast. Any other hands? Can you get this lady here? Student: Once you delete the dominated strategies, then you kind of go through it again and then 2 is dominated by 3. But what about right now before we delete anything? So how about my payoff versus 1, for example. In particular, if the other candidate were to choose position 1, I would get a higher share of the vote choosing 2 than I would have done if I had chosen 3.

Professor Ben Polak: So Christine has pointed something out. Student: When you delete the dominated strategy of 2 dominating 1, or 1 being dominated, when you delete that and 10, then it is. The voters are still there. Once again, we can try it out. The payoff from choosing 3 against 2 is what?

Someone can shout out. So far choosing 3 is better. Against 4, the payoff from choosing 2 against 4 is what? And again, you can see exactly the same pattern is going to emerge here. The same pattern Steven pointed out before. Okay, so where are we going here? Where are we going? Where is this discussion going to end up? Then we ruled out 3 and 8, and then we ruled out, we would have done 4 and 7 and that leaves just 5 and 6. So this procedure leads us to conclude that the candidates will choose positions 5 and 6.

Does 5 dominate 6, or 6 dominate 5, or anything like that? So this was just a simple exercise, I think. Let me just look out there, is everyone following that okay? In particular, this is a famous model in political science. Anyone know the name of this model? The prediction here is that the candidates are going to be squeezed towards the middle.

Anyone know? Hold the thought on that. Someone at the back, shout out. So the prediction is candidates crowd the center and this is called, in Political Science, the Median Voter Theorem. How does this do as a prediction of the real world?

They really were crowding the center. And eight years later Nixon seemed to have learned his lesson. So again, they were crowding that center space. He took the Democratic Party to the right, i. So there are examples in American History of elections that seem to—in which the Median Voter Theorem seems to do well.

Somebody mentioned it already over there. That would be convenient. But unfortunately, gas stations, as we all know, they tend to crowd into the same corners, they tend to be on the same road junctions, right? So in politics, this is about candidates crowding close together towards the center, to try and get as many voters who are close to them.

The people associated with this are a guy called Anthony Downs, who did this in Political Science, in a book in And in Economics, a guy called Hotelling, who wrote a paper about this in What do we think of the strengths and weaknesses of this model? So what I want you to start thinking about is: do you believe this model? Is this a good model of politics?

Let me come off the stage a second, so I can encourage you to get involved in the discussion. How many of you are Poly Sci majors? Raise your hands you Poly Sci majors. By the way, how many of you are Poly Sci majors who have seen this model before? Some of you have seen it before. You all live in America. You all live in a democracy. Do you have some idea about this? So what are we missing here? So can we get the woman here Ale? Professor Ben Polak: So one thing that seems odd about the way we set up this model is that the voters are not evenly distributed.

Good, anything else? Can I get the guy over here? We assumed here that everyone votes, is that right? How about the gentleman here in the yellow. Professor Ben Polak: Good, so we assumed, we kind of jumped to just one election and at least in the American system, for better or for worse—I could voice an opinion on that—there are lots of little elections on the way.

There are primaries in all these states that you never, you probably have heard of, states you probably have heard of along the way. Anything else? Can we get the woman in green here? Let me get a couple more, can we get? Professor Ben Polak: So another issue here is, I just assumed that there were two candidates. We know in some elections there was third candidate.

For example, there was Nader in the election in—well I guess he was there in the other one as well—but he was particularly there in So in principle, in that election in , there was at least four candidates, as it were, four things you could do with your vote. Let me get this guy here. Student: Extrapolating from the fact that there are different things which people take into account, not everyone closest to 6 might actually vote for 6, it might be coincidence.

I had a different thing in mind. Let me say it. So I think this is important. His track record in Texas probably did actually look a lot like that. But as you all know, those candidates almost all have track records, and not everybody believes that Clinton, that Hilary Clinton, is quite so centrist as she now seems. And not everyone believes that the former Governor of Massachusetts is quite so conservative as he now seems. So we have many candidates, more than just two; or we have not voting, which is related to that actually; and we have choosing your position, the inability to commit to a position.

We had some others. We had primaries; and we had other dimensions, so we had higher dimensions. Have I got the main ones now? I think I got most of the main ones. A lot of things are not seeming to be captured by it. That, I think, is the wrong conclusion here. The right conclusion, I think, is: the reason we write down these models is to try and capture and test our intuitions.

In this case, the intuition about crowding towards the center to get votes. But, of course, these models abstract from very important parts of reality, and the next step to do is what? The result survives this change. What about the one about many candidates? Well clearly that matters a lot. You can learn whether it makes a difference.

The one about committing to policy: this is important. Let me give you a historical example outside of America, but in the real world, in England. He took the—In England you have to publish your economic and financial plans of the Government five years in ahead.

So not only was he choosing a position close to the Conservatives: he was choosing exactly their position. And it came down to what somebody else said here: that left the election on the other dimension, which might have been character or whatever. That won; that won by a big way. So this is great stuff for this area of Political Science. Active 7 months ago. Viewed 87 times. Improve this question.

Giskard Slim Shady Slim Shady 1 1 silver badge 5 5 bronze badges. Add a comment. Active Oldest Votes. This is easy to show, think of "unraveling toward the center. Improve this answer. Sign up or log in Sign up using Google.