Nunn-lugar programs

Those who support the CTR programs have argued that U. They note that the United States does not provide Russia with cash that it can divert to these efforts; it provides technology, expertise, and other in-kind assistance for specific projects. Relationship to Key Program Objectives. Some observers dispute the Clinton Administration's positive assessment of the value of CTR assistance by noting that the program has failed to result in the verified dismantlement of any nuclear warheads.

Even those who do not use the single measure of dismantled warheads have questioned whether U. But others point out that most CTR projects were in their early stages when these nations gave up the nuclear weapons on their territories, so the amount of CTR money actually expended as opposed to the amount obligated to those projects was too low to have produced significant results.

The General Accounting Office highlighted this point in its report, stating that "to date, the material impact emphasis added of the aid actually delivered by the CTR program's destruction and dismantlement projects has generally been limited. It also did not measure the effect that promises of U.

For example, the Administration noted that the promise of U. These three nations had each agreed to return their nuclear weapons to Russia in the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, but each began to question this commitment and all voiced concerns about the costs of eliminating the delivery vehicles and basing facilities for these weapons.

But Clinton Administration officials noted that U. As was noted above, the Clinton Administration has divided the CTR program into three distinct project areas: destruction and dismantlement; chain of custody; and demilitarization. Many projects that received significant funding in recent years focused on strategic offensive arms elimination and other dismantlement and destruction activities.

To date, funding for demilitarization efforts has been relatively low and Congress has refused to fund some projects in this area. This is discussed in more detail below.

Several factors have affected the balance of funding among CTR program areas. For example, the focus of U. Early projects assisted the safe and secure transportation of warheads out of the non-Russian republics, a process that is now complete.

In recent years, a significant portion of U. Some analysts argue that the funding outcomes reflect political and organizational, as much as policy priorities. Because the Department of Defense preferred to focus on dismantlement and destruction activities, these efforts received the most CTR funding in recent years. The preferences and priorities of officials in the recipient nations have also affected the funding for CTR programs.

For example, officials in the non-Russian republics indicated that they could not eliminate the nuclear weapons on their territories unless they received financial assistance for this effort. As a result, CTR funding for strategic offensive arms and nuclear infrastructure elimination has grown in recent years.

At the same time, although the United States would have liked to allocate more funds for chain of custody efforts, officials in Russia did not share this priority. Several analysts have noted that officials at MINATOM have been unwilling to give the United States access to sensitive facilities where most nuclear materials are stored.

Officials in Russia have also taken steps that slowed the implementation of some projects. For example, the United States is helping Russia design and construct a facility at Mayak, near the Russian city of Chelyabinsk, to store materials and components from nuclear weapons. Officials in Russia altered the design plans and the two sides were unable to agree on the details of the final design or construction schedules for the facility.

In early , Clinton Administration officials noted that the two sides had resolved many of these issues and construction was proceeding. However, they noted that the project could slow again because MINATOM had not been able to provide its full financial contribution to the project and because the two nations had not reached an agreement on transparency measures that would assure that materials stored in the facility remained there.

The following discussion highlights some of the specific differences in priorities. Dismantlement and Destruction Activities. Most Members of Congress continue to support U. Some, however, have questioned whether the United States needs to provide so much assistance on some projects that may not have direct implications for U.

Specifically, some Members have questioned whether the United States should help fund the elimination of Russia's chemical weapons. In FY and FY, the House cut out funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility; the funds were restored by the Conference Committee. Nevertheless, in FYand FY, the Conference Committee adopted the House position and eliminated funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility.

The House Armed Services Committee continued to express concerns about this project, but appeared willing to proceed as long as Russia maintained its financial commitment to the effort and as long as the international community appeared willing to help with funding.

Congress eventually approved the Administration's request, but the House, again, sought to reduce the funding level and to link it to funding from other nations. Chain of Custody Activities. Most Members of Congress also believe that chain of custody projects generally serve U. Some have, however, questioned the U. In addition, some questioned the need for added funds in these areas because the United States and Russia had not yet concluded agreements needed to implement some of the projects.

These funds will be used to support the design and construction of the fissile materials storage facility at Mayak, the provision of containers that will hold the stored fissile materials, and improvements in security at weapons storage areas. Some in Congress believe that the Administration has devoted too few resources to ensuring the safety and security of materials that could be used to produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

This concern, and questions about the U. The added funds supported materials protection, control, and accounting projects and efforts to dismantle facilities that had produced chemical and biological weapons. Demilitarization Programs. But, many have been critical of projects designed to convert plants in Russia's defense industry to peaceful endeavors. Some believe that this funding will simply subsidize the Russian defense industry and would rather use the funds for defense conversion or other projects in the United States.

In addition, in its report, the General Accounting Office found that most CTR defense conversion efforts were "converting dormant facilities that once produced items related to weapons of mass destruction," rather than eliminating current production capacity.

The Clinton Administration responded to these criticisms by noting that defense conversion projects at dormant facilities would reduce pressure on Russia to reopen these plants and either rearm itself or sell high-tech weapons abroad. In addition, U. Congress was not swayed by these arguments. Congress has also strongly opposed the use of CTR funds for housing construction and environmental restoration projects. In support of these projects, Secretary Perry noted that several former Soviet republics have laws that prohibit the demobilization of military units unless there is civilian housing for the officers retiring from that unit.

But these new nations suffer from severe housing shortages. So, without assistance in the construction of housing, the recipient nations would not have been able to complete the deactivation and elimination of nuclear weapons on their territories.

Both Ukraine and Belarus claimed that the Soviet Union had seriously undermined the environment when establishing nuclear missile bases in their nations. As a result, these nations sought U. Many in Congress were not convinced by these arguments. They have argued that the funds could be better used for projects in the United States; some suggested that the funds could provide housing for U. Both supporters and critics of the CTR program have noted that final costs of some projects could grow as the projects proceed.

In addition, they have noted that, in many cases, Russia seems less willing, or able, to commit resources to these projects than does the United States.

As a result, some have expressed concerns that the United States could end up paying far more than it intended to complete projects that were initiated with the expectation that Russia would contribute a substantial portion of the funding. The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that Russia's economic weakness may limit its contribution to some CTR projects, but it does not agree that the United States will end up footing Russia's portion of the bill.

Nevertheless, Congress included several provisions in the FY Defense Authorization Act that are designed to limit the size of the U. This provision responded not only to concerns about Russia's willingness to commit its own resources to the arms elimination process, but also to lingering concerns about Russia's strategic modernization programs.

Congress has also sought to limit the U. Virtually all supporters and critics of the CTR programs agree that U. Many disagree, however, on which activities should be linked to U.

Requirements in Current Legislation. When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in , it mandated that the President certify annually that each of the recipients is committed to:. Through FY, the Clinton Administration consistently certified that each of the recipient nations -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan -- met these conditions.

The Administration withdrew its certification for Belarus for FY because that nation has demonstrated a pattern of human rights abuses. The debate results, in part, from the fact that the President must certify that each of the recipient nations is committed to the actions specified in the conditions. Some observers argue that this formulation leaves too much room for interpretation because the Clinton Administration can base its certification on statements by Russian leaders, rather than actual events or activities.

For example, the Clinton Administration acknowledged that some Russian activities raise questions about compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and the bilateral Chemical Weapons Data Exchange and Destruction Agreements.

The Bush Administration, however, refused to certify Russian compliance with these agreements in Instead it sought, and received, permission from Congress to waive the certification requirements. In some cases, critics argue that the United States does not have enough information to draw the conclusions needed in the certifications. For example, the Clinton Administration certified that Russia was not using fissile materials from dismantled weapons in new weapons because Russia has agreed to sell the United States metric tons of uranium from nuclear weapons.

But many observers have noted that this represents a small proportion of the highly enriched uranium that the Soviet Union produced over the years. And the United States has no way of knowing what Russia is doing with the rest of the uranium, regardless of any verbal assurances received from the Yeltsin government. Similarly, the Clinton Administration has noted that Russia does not plan to reuse plutonium from eliminated weapons because it has sought U.

Russian officials have stated that they did not need such a facility when they were reusing materials in new weapons. But, many observers have noted that the United States does not know how much plutonium the Soviet Union produced, so it will never know whether the plutonium placed in the storage facility came from old stockpiles or dismantled warheads. In some cases, critics have questioned the conditions in the current legislation because they allow the recipient nations to pursue activities that can threaten U.

For example, when certifying that recipient nations are using their own resources to eliminate nuclear and other weapons, the Administration has pointed to the progress that these nations have made in reducing their weapons under the START I Treaty. But some observers charge that Russia, in particular, must not be committing enough of its own resources to weapons dismantlement because it has continued to commit resources to weapons modernization programs.

They argue, similarly, that these ongoing modernization programs indicate that Russia is not satisfying the condition that it forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirements. Critics claim that two programs in particular -- the continuing production of the follow-on to the SS ICBM now designated the SS ICBM and reports of continuing work on a huge underground military complex at Yamanatau in the Urals Mountains -- provide evidence of excessive military modernization in Russia.

The Clinton Administration agreed that Russia was modernizing its ICBM force with the new, single-warhead SS missile, but it argues that this program is neither prohibited by nor inconsistent with Russia's obligations under arms control treaties. To the contrary, the United States has tried to craft arms control agreements so that the Soviet Union now Russia would replace its large, multiple warhead missiles with single-warhead systems.

This is because most analysts believe single-warhead missiles do not pose the same destabilizing first strike threat as multiple warhead systems. And, because Russia has to eliminate so many multiple warhead missiles under START II, it can only keep its forces at the levels permitted by that treaty if it produces new single-warhead systems. With respect to the underground facility at Yamanatau, the Clinton Administration has noted that this project seems misplaced in light of Russia's economic crisis, but it does not believe the complex is a threat to the United States at this time.

Proposals for Changes in the Linkage between U. Assistance and Russian Policies. Several members of Congress and analysts outside government have suggested changes in the certification process and new links between U. Stricter Standards for Certification. Some have proposed that Congress alter the certification process by removing the "committed to" section of legislation.

This change could reduce the Administration's flexibility when determining whether recipients should continue to receive U. For example, the United States would have to certify that the recipient nations were actually complying with all arms control agreements, not just committed to such compliance. Although Congress has not adopted this change for all arms control efforts, it did, in the FY Defense Authorization Act, block expenditures on chemical weapons and biological weapons projects until the Administration provides such certifications with respect to chemical weapons and biological weapons agreements, or until the Administration certifies that these projects are in the U.

Some have also proposed that Congress alter the legislation so that the United States would have to certify that Russia had ceased all nuclear modernization programs without reference to whether the U. Those who favor this approach see it as a response to concerns about whether U. Some supporters of CTR programs have objected to these proposed changes. They note that strict compliance with arms control agreements is an elusive objective. The United States and Russia often have questions about the other side's compliance records; most of the perceived problems are not central to the treaty's objectives or significant enough to justify a disruption in ongoing CTR projects.

And some have noted that CTR projects, such as the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility, could actually help the recipient nations meet their arms control obligations. Cutting off assistance in response to question's about Russia's compliance to date with chemical weapons agreements could actually prove counterproductive.

CTR supporters have also noted the efforts to link CTR assistance to Russian nuclear weapons modernization could produce unintended consequences. They believe that, if forced to choose, Russia would continue its modernization programs and leave older weapons in place. This would not serve the long-standing U. These included not only Russia's compliance with arms control agreements and nuclear weapons modernization programs but also Russia's military operations in Chechnya, its relationship with other former Soviet republics, its planned sale of short range missiles to China, and its cooperation programs with other nations including Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

Others have argued that such links would be ineffective. They note that the value of U. And they argue that Russia would probably forgo U. Others have stated that the CTR program was the wrong place to raise these issues because the United States would undermine its own interests if it stopped the CTR programs to punish Russia for its behavior in other areas. But to use the CTR program as the vehicle to challenge on all these other bases I would suggest Even though the original impetus for U.

Nevertheless, Congress has prohibited CTR expenditures on some demilitarization programs and has questioned progress on several other projects. Another standing issue was a stated lack of need for American financing. In June , prior to the expiration of the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement, Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin reached an agreement to continue US-Russian nuclear security efforts, albeit in a truncated form.

Under the terms of this new framework, the US is able to continue most of its nuclear security-related work, but ceased joint efforts pertaining to the dismantling of missiles, bombers, and chemical weapons. Russia has assumed responsibility, financial and otherwise, for carrying out the latter three dismantlement efforts. Former senators Nunn and Lugar have expressed cautious optimism about the new arrangement.

In a statement released shortly after the new agreement was reached, Nunn applauded Obama and Putin for continuing US-Russian cooperation in WMD security, but also stressed the need for the two sides to find a way to continue joint work on the components of Nunn-Lugar that will not continue under the new framework, such as delivery system dismantlement and tasks pertaining to chemical and biological weapons.

In an interview with Global Security Newswire , Lugar struck a similar tone, but also expressed concern that the end of Nunn-Lugar could lead to a decrease in funding and support for other nonproliferation programs.

Sources: — U. The MNEPR provides the legal framework that allows important bilateral nuclear security efforts to continue. Nov 24, Nunn-Lugar helped tamp down the Ukraine crisis but its contours were already visible in the early s:. Jan 22, Ukraine could not have kept the nuclear warheads even if it wanted to:.

Sep 16, Russian nuclear weapons centers were in deep crisis in Jul 30, Minister of Atomic Energy V. Mikhailov to President B. Yeltsin, July 30, Russian nuclear weapons centers faced catastrophe as late as Jun 20, Oct 23, Russian intelligence services suspected mixed motives in Nunn-Lugar assistance, but also saw benefits to Russian national security:. Mar 16, Nov 16,